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HOME-COUNTRY EFFECTS OF CORPORATE 
INVERSIONS 
Omri Marian* 
Abstract: This Article develops a framework for the study of the unique effects of 
corporate inversions (meaning, a change in corporate residence for tax purposes) in the 
jurisdictions from which corporations invert (“home jurisdictions”). Currently, empirical 
literature on corporate inversions overstates its policy implications. It is frequently argued 
that in response to an uncompetitive tax environment, corporations may relocate their 
headquarters for tax purposes, which, in turn, may result in the loss of positive economic 
attributes in the home jurisdiction (such as capital expenditures, research and development 
activity, and high-quality jobs). The association of tax-residence relocation with the 
dislocation of meaningful economic attributes, however, is not empirically supported and is 
theoretically tenuous. The Article uses case studies to fill this gap. Based on observed 
factors, the Article develops grounded propositions that may describe the meaningful effects 
of inversions in home jurisdictions. The case studies suggest that whether tax-relocation is 
associated with the dislocation of meaningful economic attributes is a highly contextualized 
question. It seems, however, that inversions are more likely to be associated with dislocation 
of meaningful attributes when non-tax factors support the decision to invert. This suggests 
that policymakers should be able to draft tax-residence rules that exert non-tax costs on 
corporate locational decisions in order to prevent tax-motivated inversions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Much of the international tax reform discourse in the United States is 
grounded in two truths:1 First, multinational corporations’ (MNCs) 
locational decisions are sensitive to home-country tax burdens.2 High 
1. See Part I, infra, for a description of U.S. tax policy discourse in this context. 
2. Michael P. Devereux, The Impact of Taxation on the Location of Capital, Firms and Profit: A 
Survey of Empirical Evidence 41 (Oxford Univ. Centre for Bus. Tax’n Working Paper No. 0702, 
2007) (“It is clear from this accumulated evidence that taxation does play a role in affecting the 
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taxes in an MNC’s home jurisdiction may induce the MNC to relocate 
its tax-residence to a low-tax jurisdiction.3 Second, having an MNC 
headquartered within a jurisdiction has positive effects on the local 
economy in the form of increased capital expenditures, research and 
development (R&D) activities, and high-quality jobs.4 
The combination of these two truths has led to a policy argument that 
U.S. tax-law should not target corporate headquarters’ locations. Taxing 
an MNC based on the location of its headquarters raises a concern that 
“management . . . would flee to other countries,”5 resulting in the loss of 
both the corporate tax base as well as the positive externalities 
associated with having the headquarters located within the United 
States.6 This Article suggests, however, that this policy argument is 
overstated for two reasons. 
First, there is no reason to assume that the place of tax-residence is 
also the place of the economic attributes that policymakers care about. 
For example, under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) corporate tax-
residence is determined based on the place of incorporation (POI). There 
is little reason to expect that the place of incorporation and the place of a 
corporation’s meaningful attributes converge around a single location. 
Unfortunately, much of the empirical research in this area implicitly 
assumes such convergence. It is well established, however, that the 
meaningful functions of the modern MNCs are decentralized.7 Different 
substantive attributes of a corporation may be located in different 
jurisdictions, which are not necessarily the jurisdiction of the MNC’s tax 
choices made by multinational companies.”). 
3. See, e.g., Tomi Laamanen, Tatu Simula & Sami Torstila, Cross-Border Relocations of 
Headquarters in Europe, 43 J. INT’L BUS. STUDS. 187 (2012) (finding that high home country taxes 
increase the likelihood of corporate headquarters relocation); Johannes Voget, Relocation of 
Headquarters and International Taxation, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 1067 (2011) (finding that additional 
home country tax due upon repatriation of foreign earnings has a positive effect on the probability 
of corporate migration). 
4. Kimberly A. Clausing, Should Tax Policy Target Multinational Firm Headquarters?, 63 
NAT’L TAX J. 741, 744 (2010). For a summary of such possible positive effects see id. at 744–47. 
5. Tax Reform Options: International Issues: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 112th Cong. 
15 (2011) [hereinafter Tax Reform Options] (statement of James T. Hines Jr., Collegiate Professor 
of Law, University of Michigan Law School); id. at 9 (statement of Scott Naatjes, Vice President 
and General Tax Counsel, Cargill Inc.) (stating that taxing corporations based on their place of 
management would “put at risk highly mobile headquarters job and all economic benefits they 
create to our Nation”). 
6. See id. at 47–48 (statement of James T. Hines Jr., Collegiate Professor of Law, University of 
Michigan Law School) (stating that taxing corporations based on the place of management 
“discourages firms from locating management activities in a country that uses such standard, which 
is not sensible if management activities are thought to be desirable”). 
7. See discussion in Part II.B.1 infra. 
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residence. Tax residence can be changed with no need to dislocate any 
meaningful structures in the jurisdiction from which an MNC inverts. 
Conversely, economic attributes of an MNC can be shifted across 
borders with no corresponding change to the tax-residence. A change of 
an MNC’s tax-residence (“inversion”) and a dislocation of economic 
attributes in the jurisdiction from which the MNC inverts are two 
distinct phenomena. 
Second, even if corporate tax-residence is based on the location of 
meaningful economic attributes (for example, by determining tax-
residence based on the place of management or assets), there is no 
reason to assume that MNCs will dislocate such attributes en masse in 
order to change their tax-residence. Literature in organizational studies 
suggests that meaningful corporate functions are likely to be located in 
jurisdictions that offer substantive non-tax advantages, such as 
developed financial markets, skilled labor force, infrastructure and other 
agglomeration benefits.8 The dislocation of real attributes is costly and 
may result in the loss of agglomeration benefits. This Article suggests 
that when the dislocation of real economic attributes is necessary in 
order to “lose” tax-residence, tax savings may not justify the cost of such 
dislocation. Stated differently, current literature fails to balance the tax 
benefit expected from an inversion, with the non-tax cost associated with 
arbitraging one tax regime for another.9 
A possible reason for the lack of coherence in policy implications of 
inversions literature is that it lacks testable theoretical constructs. Public 
finance economists have long studied the effects of taxation on 
locational decisions.10 However, there is no theoretical framework that 
explains what substantive dislocations may specifically be associated 
with inversion transactions. This Article aims to fill such gaps through 
case study research. The aim is to develop theoretical propositions based 
on observed dislocations in inversion transactions. Several case studies 
of large-scale inversions are examined in order to articulate—in policy-
8. See Julian Birkinshaw et al., Why Do Some Multinational Corporations Relocate Their 
Headquarters Overseas?, 27 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 681, 682 (2006) (“There are well established 
theories of agglomeration in the literature, and it is now accepted that proximity to specialized labor, 
complementary suppliers and customers, and access to knowledge spillovers are all important 
benefits to the firm.”).  
9. See Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 231 (2010) (explaining that 
regulatory arbitrage makes sense “[s]o long as the regulatory savings outweighs the increase in 
transactional costs”). For a discussion of tax-arbitrage opportunities specifically in the context of 
entities’ residence and classification rules, see Diane M. Ring, One Nation Among Many: Policy 
Implications of Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage, 44 B.C. L. REV. 79, 94–98 (2002). 
10. For a detailed summary of this voluminous literature see Devereux, supra note 2.  
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relevant terms—the possible meaningful economic effects of an 
inversion in the jurisdiction from which a corporation inverts. 
This Article finds that inversions driven exclusively by tax 
considerations are less likely to be associated with dislocation of real 
economic attributes, compared with inversions supported by non-tax 
reasons. These findings are consistent with literature in organizational 
studies.11 This Article therefore suggests that policymakers should be 
able to prevent inversions that lack economic substance by imposing 
stricter locational rules on corporate taxation. This can be achieved, for 
example, by determining corporate tax-residence based on substantive 
factors (such as the place of management) rather than formal ones (such 
as the place of incorporation). The Article thus situates itself within the 
vast literature on “frictions.” Broadly speaking, frictions literature 
postulates that abusive tax planning can be mitigated by attaching non-
tax costs to the planning scheme.12 This added non-tax cost is referred to 
as a “friction” that may discourage the tax-planning.13 In the context of 
this Article, such non-tax frictions would result from the requirement to 
dislocate real activities away from the home jurisdiction in order to 
invert. Business considerations thus would serve to deter tax-motivated 
inversions. 
The policy discussion on the implications of inversions gained 
urgency recently with the advent of a wave of corporate expatriations 
from the United States to other jurisdictions.14 Over the past five years, 
multiple U.S.-based MNCs have changed their tax-residence,15 moving 
out of the U.S. to jurisdictions such as the UK, Ireland and 
Switzerland.16 One possible way to deal with the problem is to enforce 
11. Julian Birkinshaw et al., supra note 8. 
12. See, e.g., Leigh Osofsky, Who Is Naughty and Who Is Nice? Frictions, Screening, and Tax 
Law Design, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 1057, 1059–75 (2013) (summarizing tax-frictions literature); Adam 
H. Rosenzweig, Harnessing the Costs of International Tax Arbitrage, 26 VA. TAX REV. 555, 579–
80 (2007) (describing how reduced frictions associated with entity classification rules may induce 
tax planning); David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 
1312, 1323–38 (2001) (offering a framework for the design of successful frictions).  
13. See MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY 9 (Alana Bradley et al. 
eds., 3d ed. 2004) (defining “frictions” as “transaction costs incurred in the marketplace that make 
implementation of certain tax planning strategies costly”). 
14. See DONALD J. MARPLES & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CORPORATE 
EXPATRIATIONS, INVERSIONS, AND MERGERS: TAX ISSUES 5–7 (2014) (describing the recent 
inversions phenomenon).  
15. For a summary of recent inversion transactions see Martin A. Sullivan, Lessons from the Last 
War on Inversions, 142 TAX NOTES 861, 866 (2014). 
16. MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 14, at 5 (noting that “these types of inversions generally 
target countries such as Ireland, Switzerland, and, more recently, the UK”). 
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stricter locational tax rules. Specifically, the POI tax-residence test 
enables a U.S. MNC to invert without any significant dislocation in the 
U.S., simply by changing its place of incorporation. It has therefore been 
suggested to tax corporations based on substantive factors, such as the 
place of management or the place of assets, sales and employees.17 
Others have resisted such proposals, arguing that taxing U.S. MNCs 
based on the locations of substantive attributes creates an incentive to 
dislocate such attributes out of the United States in order to “lose” tax-
residence (rather than to simply incorporate some place else while 
maintaining the meaningful attributes in the U.S.).18 The solution, this 
group of scholars argues, is to make the U.S. corporate tax system more 
“competitive” so as to eliminate the tax incentives to invert.19 The case 
studies explored in this Article suggest that the dislocation of meaningful 
attributes in the context of inversion transactions is a highly context-
dependent issue, and that the fear of substantive dislocations is not 
always warranted. 
This Article is structured as follows: Part I briefly outlines some of 
the current policy considerations and legislative proposals aimed at 
dealing with the problem of corporate inversions. Part II surveys current 
literature on MNCs’ tax-residence locational decisions and explains the 
limitations of such literature for tax policy-making. It also develops a 
framework for understanding inversions in the context of tax-friction 
literature. Part III explains why a case-study approach may overcome 
some of the limitations of empirical research. It then executes a case-
study analysis of five events in which MNCs relocated their residences 
for tax purposes. Part IV analyzes the case studies surveyed and 
identifies observation-based patterns that warrant further research. This 
Part also observes that frictions (or rather, lack thereof) seem to play an 
important role in the decision to invert, and discusses some of the policy 
implications of this finding. The Article concludes with a summary of its 
limitations and caveats and a call for a more nuanced empirical approach 
in the study of the meaningful effects of corporate inversions. 
I. BACKGROUND: CORPORATE INVERSIONS AND THE TAX 
RESIDENCE DEBATE 
The purpose of this Part is to briefly describe the phenomenon of 
corporate inversions and explain why inversions are a focal point of tax 
17. See infra notes 57–60 and accompanying discussion. 
18. See infra notes 39–43 and accompanying discussion. 
19. Id. 
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policy-making. Part I.A briefly describes the history of inversions of 
U.S. MNCs, and discusses one major congressional response to it. Part 
I.B outlines current political discourse in the wake of current wave of 
inversions. 
A. The Two Waves of Corporate Inversions 
During the late 1990s through the early 2000s the United States 
experienced a wave of transactions by which U.S.-based multinational 
corporate groups restructured themselves as multinational groups 
controlled by parents incorporated in tax havens.20 The change of place 
of incorporation was the only effect of such restructurings. No shift of 
economic activity from the U.S. to the new jurisdiction followed.21 This 
period of inversions is sometimes described as the “first wave” of 
corporate inversions.22 
These transactions, known as “naked inversions,”23 were completely 
tax-driven. They were made easily possible because, for tax purposes, 
the United States determines the residence of corporations based on 
POI.24 Thus, reincorporation as a foreign corporation makes an MNC 
“foreign” for federal income tax purposes. Such transactions were 
perceived as abusive (and even an “unpatriotic tax dodge”).25 Congress 
responded with the enactment of Section 7874 of the Internal Revenue 
Code in 2004.26 
Section 7874 prevents naked inversions by treating an inverted 
corporation as “domestic” for tax purposes (notwithstanding its foreign 
incorporation) if it is eighty percent owned by shareholders of the former 
20. MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 14, at 54 (stating the corporations inverted primarily to 
“Bermuda and the Cayman Islands were the location of many of the newly created parent 
corporations—jurisdictions that have no corporate income tax but that also do have highly 
developed legal, institutional, and communications infrastructures”). 
21. Id. (stating that “[t]hese corporate inversions apparently involved few, if any, shifts in actual 
economic activity”). 
22. Zachary R. Mider, Medtronic Is Biggest Yet to Renounce U.S. Tax Citizenship, BLOOMBERG 
(Jun. 16, 2014, 1:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-16/medtronic-is-biggest-firm-
yet-to-renounce-u-s-tax-status.html (describing the late 1990s to the early 2000s period as “the first 
wave of corporate inversions”). 
23. MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 14, at 3 (stating that an “inversion [that] does not require 
any change in the effective control of the corporation, . . . is referred to as a ‘naked inversion’”). 
24. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4) (2012). 
25. Hale E. Sheppard, Flight or Fight of U.S.-Based Multinational Business: Analyzing the 
Causes for, Effects of, and Solutions to the Corporate Inversion Trend, 23 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 
551, 557–58 (2003) (describing how corporate inversions were perceived by media and policy 
makers in the early 2000s). 
26. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418. 
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domestic parent.27 If the inverted corporation is sixty percent owned by 
shareholders of the former parent, then the corporation is unfavorably 
taxed in the U.S. for a period of ten years on gains from dispositions of 
certain assets.28 Such tax may or may not affect the decision to invert, 
depending on the particular status of the inverting corporation. For 
example, if less than eighty percent but more than sixty percent of the 
inverted corporation shareholders were shareholders of the old 
corporation, there is no disincentive in inverting as long as the 
disposition of the inverting corporation’s assets is not expected to 
generate gains. In such a case no corporate tax liability is expected as a 
result of the inversion. 
In order to allow inversions that are not driven by tax avoidance (but 
rather by real business considerations), an exception has been added to 
the anti-inversion rules of Section 7874. The exception applies if the 
inverted corporation has “substantial business activity” in the 
jurisdiction to which it inverted.29 Section 7874 largely succeeded at 
shutting down naked inversions.30 
Evidently, Section 7874 leaves two avenues open for an inversion 
transaction. First, an inverting U.S. corporation may merge with a 
smaller foreign-incorporated corporation, creating a foreign-incorporated 
entity which is less than eighty percent owned by owners of the former 
corporation, thus avoiding the eighty percent ownership threshold. 
Alternatively, a U.S.-based MNC can merge with, or purchase, a smaller 
foreign corporation with some activity in the foreign jurisdiction—
making the foreign corporation the parent—thus qualifying for the 
“substantial business activity” exception. Under current regulatory 
guidance, the “substantial business activity” exception is met if at least 
twenty-five percent of the employees, assets, and sales of the combined 
entity are located in the new jurisdiction.31 
U.S.-based MNCs have identified these opportunities to avoid U.S. 
tax jurisdiction. Over the past several years multiple U.S. MNCs have 
purchased or merged with smaller foreign corporations—incorporated in 
27. I.R.C. § 7874(b) (2012). 
28. I.R.C. § 7874 (defining an “expatriated entity”, among others, as an inverting corporation in 
which at least sixty percent of the stock (by vote or value) are held by former shareholders. 
Expatiated entities are subject to U.S. tax on “inversion gain” for a period of ten years after the 
inversion. Expatriated entities are denied from using certain credits in order to reduce their inversion 
gain). 
29. I.R.C. § 7874(a)(2)(B)(iii). 
30. MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 14, at 6 (“The 2004 Act largely eliminated the generic 
naked inversions.”).  
31. Treas. Reg. § 1.7874-3T (2014). 
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places like the UK, Ireland or Switzerland—in order to change their tax-
residence.32 Some of the most conspicuous examples include Perrigo, 
the U.S. drugmaker, which acquired Irish biotech corporation Elan in an 
$8.6 billion deal;33 Medtronic, the U.S. medical devices maker, which 
merged with the Irish-based Covidien (which itself inverted in 2008) in a 
$42.9 billion deal;34 and the failed attempt by Pfizer, the giant U.S. 
pharmaceuticals corporation, to acquire the UK-based pharmaceuticals 
company AstraZeneca in a $118 billion (!) hostile takeover.35 This 
renewed corporate expatriation activity has been dubbed the “second 
wave” of corporate expatriations.36 The continued trend of inversions 
eventually prompted the Department of Treasury to respond, issuing 
guidance aimed at denying some of the tax benefits associated with 
inversions.37 Whether this guidance will succeed at stopping inversions 
remains to be seen.38 
B. Current Policy Discussion on Corporate Inversions 
Many have suggested that in order to deal with the problem of 
inversions the United States should adopt a more “competitive” tax 
system. Most prominently it has been suggested the U.S. should abandon 
its system of worldwide taxation. Under the U.S. worldwide tax system, 
corporate taxes are imposed on worldwide income of domestic 
corporations (though foreign-sourced business income is only taxed 
when repatriated).39 This is unlike most other industrialized 
32. MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 14. 
33. Jonathan D. Rockoff, Perrigo to Buy Elan, Gain Lower Tax Rate, WALL ST. J., July 29, 2013, 
at B3, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324354704578634652886726058. 
34. Catherine Boyle, Medtronic $43B Covidien Deal-and Irish Tax Move, CNBC (Jun. 16, 2014, 
8:25 AM) http://www.cnbc.com/id/101760661. 
35. Ben Hirschler & Bill Berkort, Pfizer Walks Away from $118 Bln AstraZeneca Takeover Fight, 
REUTERS (MAY 26, 2014, 11:53 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/26/us-astrazeneca-
pfizer-idUSBREA3R0H520140526. 
36. MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 14, at 1–2. 
37. I.R.S. Notice 2014-52. 
38. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, A World Turned Upside Down: Reflections on the ‘New 
Wave’ Inversions and Notice 2014-52, 145 TAX NOTES 95 (2014) (arguing that the notice is a 
helpful first step, but unlikely to turn the tide on inversions). 
39. Most recently, the House Committee on Ways and Means released draft legislation for a 
comprehensive tax reform that includes the adoption of a “participation exemption” system, which 
is a widely adopted variant of territoriality. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 113TH 
CONG., DISCUSSION DRAFT OF TAX REFORM ACT OF 2014, §§ 4001–4212, available at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/statutory_text_tax_reform_act_of_2014_discussion_
draft__022614.pdf. For a summary of the policy debate about the adoption of territorial system in 
the United States and competitiveness arguments in this regard, see Omri Marian, Meaningless 
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jurisdictions, which have in place some form of a “territorial” system, by 
which only profits from within the jurisdiction are taxed while profits 
from foreign sources are exempt.40 Because U.S. MNCs are taxed on 
repatriated profits while foreign competitors are not, it is argued that the 
U.S. tax system is “uncompetitive.”41 This problem is exacerbated by the 
fact that the United States has one of the highest corporate tax rates in 
the world.42 Adopting a territorial system and reducing the U.S. 
corporate tax rates, the argument goes, would put the U.S. at par with its 
trading partners, thus eliminating the incentive to invert.43 
The competitiveness argument is tenuous, however.44 
Notwithstanding the fact that the U.S. indeed has one of the highest 
nominal corporate tax rates in the world (currently thirty-five percent), it 
is unclear whether U.S. MNCs actually face higher effective tax burden 
compared with their foreign counterparts.45 Moreover, as many 
commentators have noted, myriad loopholes in current U.S. tax law 
make the U.S. tax system functionally similar to a territorial one.46 
Therefore, the benefit of territoriality cannot account for the full 
spectrum of inversion incentives. 
Rather, it has been convincingly argued that there are other major 
incentives for inversions.47 One major reason to invert is the ability to 
access untaxed foreign cash.48 Generally, under U.S. law, income of 
Comparisons: Corporate Tax Reform Discourse in the United States, 32 VA. TAX. REV. 133, 163–
67 (2012). 
40. See PHILIP DITTMER, TAX FOUND., SPECIAL REPORT NO. 202: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE ON 
TERRITORIAL TAXATION 3 (2012), available at http://taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.org/ 
files/docs/sr202_0.pdf (concluding that “[o]verwhelmingly, developed economies are turning to the 
territorial approach”). 
41. See Marian, supra note 39, at 150. 
42. For a summary of the policy debate about corporate tax rates in United States and 
competitiveness arguments in this regard, see id. 
43. See MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 14, at 12. 
44. For a full-blown rebuttal of the argument according to which inversions are driven by 
competitiveness concerns, see Edward D. Kleinbard, Competitiveness Has Nothing to Do with It, 
144 TAX NOTES 1055 (2014). 
45. Marian, supra note 39, at 158 (describing studies that contest the argument according to 
which U.S. tax rates are uncompetitive). 
46. See, e.g., J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Worse Than Exemption, 
59 EMORY L.J. 79 (2009) (describing the U.S. international tax system and suggesting that foreign-
source income of U.S. MNCs is even more generously treated than foreign-source income under 
territorial taxation principles); Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 715–
27 (2011) (explaining how the U.S. tax system is an “ersatz variant on territorial systems”). 
47. Kleinbard, Competitiveness Has Nothing to Do with It, supra note 44, at 1065–67 (explaining 
the reasons for the current wave of inversions). 
48. Id. at 1065–66 (explaining how inversions facilitate “hopscotch payments,” which allow 
 
                                                     
 
04 - Marian_final.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/13/2015  11:46 AM 
2015] CORPORATE INVERSIONS CASE STUDIES 11 
foreign subsidiaries of domestic corporations is not taxed in the United 
States until repatriated (generally in the form of dividends or other 
payments from foreign subsidiaries).49 U.S. MNCs thus focus their tax-
planning efforts on booking income with subsidiaries in low-tax 
jurisdictions, where the income remains untaxed.50 For example, the 
infamous “Double Irish Dutch Sandwich” planning technique is aimed at 
shifting income associated with patented goods from the jurisdiction 
where the good are designed, manufactured or sold, to tax havens.51 
Generically explained, this is achieved by having subsidiaries in tax-
havens own the valuable patents of the affiliated group, and have the 
affiliates in the developed (high-taxed) jurisdictions pay royalties to the 
tax haven entities. The royalties are deductible and therefore strip the 
tax-bases in the high-tax jurisdictions where factories and clients are 
located, and the income is accumulated in the tax-haven jurisdiction, 
where nothing is located other than pocket-book entities.52 
The problem for U.S. MNCs arises when they wish to access these 
pools of untaxed cash.53 If they simply repatriate the cash to the U.S. 
parent, the repatriated amounts will be taxed. If, however, by the magic 
of inversion, the U.S. parent becomes a “foreign” parent, the rules of 
repatriation taxes no longer apply. The tax-haven entities can then make 
direct payments to the foreign parent, in a foreign-to-foreign exchange 
that skips U.S. taxing jurisdiction (these payments are thus appropriately 
termed “hopscotch” payments), and can be used for stock buybacks or 
dividends. If this inversion-related planning is successful, then the 
earnings of the tax-haven subsidiaries are never taxed.54 Recent Treasury 
guidance is aimed in particular at this type of inversion benefits.55 
The second benefit of inversions stems from the fact that under U.S. 
tax law, “foreign” MNCs are better positioned to reduce the tax bill on 
inverted firms to access previously untaxed cash held in foreign subsidiaries). 
49. Of course, U.S. MNCs could theoretically avoid tax on repatriation by having foreign 
subsidiaries invest directly in U.S., or buying U.S. debt. However, the IRC prevents such planning 
by treating such amounts as deemed repatriated, and hence subject to tax. See I.R.C. § 956 (2012). 
50. Kleinbard, Competitiveness Has Nothing to Do with It, supra note 44, at 1056 (stating that 
“U.S.-domiciled multinational firms have become adroit at moving income that as an economic 
matter is earned in high-tax foreign countries to very low-taxed ones”). 
51. See Kleinbard, Stateless Income, supra note 46, at 706–13 (describing the Double Irish Dutch 
Sandwich). 
52. Id. 
53. It is estimated the U.S. MNCs currently hold, in the aggregate, two trillion dollars in offshore 
earnings. See Kleinbard, Competitiveness Has Nothing to Do with It, supra note 44, at 1057.  
54. See id. at 1065–66 (discussing “hopscotch” transactions). 
55. See IRS Notice 2014-52. 
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their U.S. source income when compared with “domestic” MNCs.56 This 
is so because a foreign parent is able to extract gains from U.S. 
operations in the form of payments that are deductible in calculating 
U.S. income (for example, interest paid by a domestic subsidiary to its 
foreign parent). This means that the adoption of a territorial system is of 
little help, since under such a system the U.S. will continue to tax 
income earned in the United States. Thus, the incentive to invert 
remains. 
For this reason, some have suggested dealing with inversions by 
making it harder for inverting corporations to avoid taxation on income 
that is substantively generated in the United States.57 Others have 
suggested reforming the way by which the United States determines 
MNCs’ residence for tax purposes.58 Specifically, many proposals 
suggest applying a “Real Seat” test that considers substantive factors in 
determining residence, instead of the formal POI test currently 
adopted.59 MNCs can easily change their POI, but it might prove more 
difficult to change the location of substantive attributes. The most 
common proposal has been to implement a residence test based on the 
central management and control (CMC),60 which is adopted by multiple 
56. See Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Expectations and Expatriations: Tracing the Cause 
and Consequences of Corporate Inversions, 55 NAT’L TAX J. 409, 438 (2002) (suggesting, among 
other things, that “managers and shareholders allowed for the possibility of reductions in domestic 
tax obligations in their consideration of the expatriation”); Bret Wells, What Corporate Inversions 
Teach About International Tax Reform, 127 TAX NOTES 1345, 1367 (2010) (Studying several case 
studies of corporate inversions in order to unravel the motives for inversions, and concluding at 
1367 that “[t]he corporate inversion phenomenon provides clear and noncontroversial evidence that 
foreign-owned firms are tax preferred whether they are competing against U.S.-owned multinational 
corporations in the U.S. domestic economy or in foreign markets”). 
57. For a summary of such proposals, see Bret Wells, Corporate Inversions and Whack-a-Mole 
Tax Policy, 143 TAX NOTES 1429, 1433–34 (2014). 
58. See, e.g., S. 1346, 112th Cong. § 103 (2011). Under the Act, a publicly traded corporation 
managed “directly or indirectly, primarily within the United States . . . shall be treated as a domestic 
corporation.” Id. Additional bills suggest likewise. See, e.g., S. 268, 113th Cong. § 103 (2013); S. 
2075, 112th Cong. § 103 (2012); H.R. 62, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011). 
59. See Omri Marian, Jurisdiction to Tax Corporations, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1619–20 (2012) 
(discussing the Real Seat test). 
60. For such proposals see, for example, Tax Reform Options, supra note 5, at 34–36 (statement 
of Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Professor, University of Michigan Law School); STAFF OF THE JOINT 
COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX 
EXPENDITURES 178–81 (Comm. Print 2005) (proposing the adoption of a CMC test); Kleinbard, 
Stateless Income, supra note 46, at 160 (suggesting to adopt a “mind and management” residence 
test). At least one commentator suggested adopting a residence test that is based on the location of 
the MNC’s largest customer base. See George K. Yin, Letter to the Editor, Stopping Corporate 
Inversions Sensibly and Legally, 144 TAX NOTES 1087 (2014). 
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industrialized jurisdictions.61 Such proposals have been met with 
criticism grounded in the argument that under a Real Seat system of tax-
residence determination, corporations would not be able to invert solely 
by changing their POI and would be induced to move real activities out 
of the U.S. in order to “lose” their U.S. tax-residence.62 The next part 
discusses the empirical literature supporting such criticism and identifies 
its shortcomings. 
II. TAXATION AND THE LOCATION OF CORPORATE 
HEADQUARTERS 
This Part explains the empirical literature that purports to support the 
argument according to which inversions may be associated with the 
dislocation of meaningful attributes in the home jurisdiction. This 
argument stands in the basis of the resistance to the adoption of a Real 
Seat test for corporate tax-residence. Part II.A briefly summarizes 
current empirical literature on corporate tax-residence decisions. 
Drawing on research in organizational studies, Part II.B explains how 
inversion literature overstates its policy implication. 
A. Empirical Literature on Corporate Inversions and Its Claimed 
Policy Implications 
There are several benefits in having a corporate headquarters located 
within a jurisdiction.63 For example, the national pride associated with 
having a well-known corporation headquartered within a jurisdiction 
may produce certain political benefits.64 In addition, a firm’s 
headquarters may bring with it job creation and capital expenditure, 
resulting in positive economic effects in the jurisdiction in which the 
headquarters operate.65 Headquarters are also likely “to generate 
learning and innovation, since research, development, and 
entrepreneurial activities”66 happen within corporate headquarters. 
Moreover, some studies find that in multinational groups, headquarters 
61. See Marian, supra note 59, at 1625–26 (discussing the widespread adoption of the CMC and 
similar residence tests in industrialized jurisdictions). 
62. See, e.g., sources cited in supra notes 5–7. 
63. Clausing, supra note 4, at 744–47 (describing the benefits of having MNC headquarters 
located within a jurisdiction). 
64. Id. at 744. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
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locations are more profitable than other locations,67 suggesting that 
“multinational headquarters will generate larger profits, higher wages 
and labor rents, and greater tax payments.”68 It is therefore obvious that 
incentives and disincentives for MNC headquarters locational decisions 
are policy-relevant. 
Several empirical studies have examined how taxes affect the 
decisions of MNCs to locate their headquarters in one jurisdiction or 
another. One recent paper by Johannes Voget questions “to what 
extent . . . observed relocations [of MNCs’ headquarters] exhibit a tax 
avoidance motive.”69 Comparing a large sample of MNCs that have 
inverted with MNCs that did not, Voget finds that home country tax on 
profits repatriated from foreign jurisdictions increases the likelihood that 
MNCs will relocate their headquarters.70 Voget concludes with a policy 
implication according to which “countries have an incentive to present 
themselves as attractive locations for headquarters if hosting 
headquarters has certain positive externalities like an increased demand 
for skilled labor, a larger tax base, or even a better representation of the 
country’s interest in the decision making of the multinational firm.”71 
Therefore, according to Voget, countries should not tax repatriated 
profits. 
In another paper, Huizinga and Voget study the impact of taxes on 
MNC structure following international mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As).72 They test cross-border M&As involving two countries, 
constructing two hypothetical tax rates for a post-merger structure, 
depending on whether the post-merger parent firm is located in one 
jurisdiction or the other. They find that taxes have a significant impact 
on the decision of where to locate the parent, and that “[c]ountries that 
impose high levels of international double taxation are less likely to 
attract the parent companies of newly created multinational firms.”73 
They suggest that such a result has important policy implications since 
“the international organization of the firm implies cross-border 
67. Matthias Dischinger, Bodo Knoll & Nadine Riedel, There Is No Place Like Home: The 
Profitability Gap Between Headquarters and their Foreign Subsidiaries, 23 J. ECON. & MGMT. 
STRATEGY 369, 370 (2014) (finding empirical evidence that an over proportional part of 
multinational group profits accrues with the corporate headquarters). 
68. Clausing, supra note 4, at 745. 
69. Voget, supra note 3, at 1067. 
70. Id. at 1079. 
71. Id. at 1079. 
72. Harry P. Huizinga & Johannes Voget, International Taxation and the Direction and Volume 
of Cross-Border M&A, 64 J. FIN. 1217 (2009). 
73. Id. at 1244. 
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relationships of ownership and control that are bound to affect the 
internal operation of the firm and the dealings of the firm with the 
affected national economies, for instance, in the form of employment.”74 
A similar study by Barrios et al., finds that MNCs’ decisions regarding 
where to locate new subsidiaries are influenced by MNCs’ home-
country taxes.75 
Laaman, Simula, and Torstila analyze a data set of fifty-two cross-
border headquarters relocations in Europe.76 They suggest that inquiry 
into the factors that drive headquarters relocations has important policy 
implications, since corporate headquarters create various “kinds of 
spillover effects to the national economy they are part of.”77 They find 
that corporate taxation plays an important role in locational decisions of 
multinationals. Specifically, they find that high taxes in a home 
jurisdiction serve as a “push factor” incentivizing corporations to 
relocate their headquarters into jurisdictions with lower taxes (i.e., low 
taxes serve as a “pull factor[]”).78 
It therefore seems that tax policymakers have good reasons to worry 
about MNCs’ decisions on the locations of their headquarters. According 
to the studies discussed, inversion may result not only in the loss of the 
tax base, but also in the loss of important attributes associated with 
having an MNC headquarters located within a jurisdiction. 
B. How Empirical Studies on Corporate Inversion Overstate Their 
Policy Implications 
1. Identifying Meaningful Headquarters Relocations 
The studies discussed above strongly support the assertion that MNCs 
are incentivized to change their tax-residences in response to high taxes 
in their countries of residence (or in response to low taxes in other 
jurisdictions). However, suggesting that headquarters relocation for tax 
purposes is also associated with the loss of meaningful attributes in the 
jurisdiction from which MNCs invert (as these studies argue), requires a 
significant logical leap. As further discussed below,79 empirical 
74. Id. 
75. Salvador Barrios et al., International Taxation and Multinational Firm Location Decisions, 
96 J. PUB. ECON. 946, 956 (2012). 
76. Laamanen, Simula, & Torstila, supra note 3, at 188. 
77. Id. at 189. 
78. Id. at 204–05. 
79. See discussion in Part II.B.2 infra. 
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literature on inversion views headquarters locational decisions as a 
binary variable (i.e., the headquarters is located either in one jurisdiction 
or the other). However, the headquarters of a modern MNC can hardly 
be viewed as a binary variable. 
It is well established that the corporate functions of the modern MNC 
are not always centralized in a single identifiable location.80 Therefore, it 
is problematic to assume that meaningful functions—the functions that 
create positive economic effects that policymakers might care about—
are located in the same place as the tax-residence of an MNC (whether 
before or after an inversion). 
For example, organizational researchers distinguish between various 
levels of corporate functions. Such functions include “obligatory 
functions (general management, treasury and tax, financial reporting),”81 
“discretionary activities (value adding and control functions related to 
HR, audit, corporate planning, IT),”82 and “operational functions 
(marketing, distribution and production).”83 Each such function may 
generate different attributes, and might be located in a different 
jurisdiction. Therefore, it is not necessarily the case that the most 
important attributes are in the jurisdiction of tax-residence, or that such 
attributes may be affected by a change to tax-residence. 
In addition, decentralization can be observed within each functional 
level. For example, “the location of the headquarters themselves has 
become increasingly scattered in recent years.”84 Mihir Deasi suggests 
that an MNC “home” is triple-faceted, divided among “managerial,” 
“financial,” and “legal” homes.85 The “managerial home” is where “the 
managerial talent and key decision-makers” are located.86 The 
managerial home itself could, for example, be dispersed among several 
jurisdictions, with various management functions performed in different 
places. A firm’s “financial home” is the “place where its shares are 
listed,”87 which in turn dictates the rights and obligations of investors 
and managers in publicly traded entities. A MNC’s “legal home” is the 
80. For a summary of research on the decentralization of corporate functions, see David Collis, 
David Young, & Michael Goold, The Size and Composition of Corporate Headquarters in 
Multinational Companies: Empirical Evidence, 18 J. INT’L MGMT. 260, 262–63 (2012). 
81. Id. at 264 (emphasis added). 
82. Id. (emphasis added). 
83. Id. (emphasis added). 
84. Clausing, supra note 4, at 743. 
85. Mihir A. Desai, The Decentring of the Global Firm, 32 WORLD ECON. 1271, 1277 (2009). 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 1278. 
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residence of the corporation for legal purposes.88 The legal home itself 
can be divided. For example, residences for tax purposes and for 
corporate-law purposes may be separately determined, creating tension 
between different jurisdictional rules.89 Each such “managerial”, 
“financial” or “legal” home may be located in a different place, and each 
such home may generate different types of positive attributes in the 
jurisdiction in which it is located. There is no reason to expect that when 
the “tax home” is changed (i.e., inversion) other “homes” will follow. 
To summarize, MNCs’ operations, and specifically MNCs 
headquarters’ functions are not “black boxes” with a single identifiable 
location. They must be viewed as complex organizational structures. 
When this is the case, it is rather a complex task to define a “relocation” 
of corporate headquarters. Organizational researchers have tackled the 
issue, however. 
For example, Birkinshaw et al. sought to explain MNCs’ decisions to 
relocate corporate headquarters and corporate business units overseas.90 
They clearly distinguish among three elements that define corporate 
headquarters: The first two are “a top management group that typically 
has an official location at which it meets . . . [and] a series of HQ 
functions . . . (treasury, investor relations, corporate communications 
etc.), each one of which has an identifiable physical location.”91 The 
third is “the legal domicile” of the MNC.92 Birkinshaw et al. recognize 
that headquarters may be incorporated in one jurisdiction for tax 
purposes but meaningfully operate in another.93 They also note that 
various substantive management functions may be located in different 
jurisdictions.94 They therefore conclude that it is “possible to 
conceptualize the HQ’s location on some sort of continuum, from 
entirely based in the home country through to entirely relocated 
overseas.”95 The degree of HQ relocation is therefore the dependent 
variable in their analysis. 
Birkinshaw et al. then study the spectrum of headquarters relocations 
88. Id. at 1280–81. 
89. For a discussion on the interaction between residence for corporate law purposes and 
residence for tax purposes, see Mitchell A. Kane & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Taxation and 
International Charter Competition, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1229 (2008). 
90. Birkinshaw et al., supra note 8. 
91. Id. at 684. 
92. Id. 
93. See id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
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based on case studies of forty MNCs, using multiple interviews and 
questioners.96 Such a method allows them to disaggregate management 
functions and identify the geographical locations of each. They find that 
business units (meaning operational functions) tend to relocate in 
response to demand of local markets and in order to take advantage of 
local agglomeration effects.97 Corporate headquarters tend to 
meaningfully relocate in response to the demand of shareholders and 
financial markets. They acknowledge that corporate tax may play a role 
in relocation decisions, but unfortunately they do not directly study it.98 
Similarly, Barner-Rasmussen, Piekkari, and Bjorkman use case 
studies to identify which factors explain the relocation of specific 
management functions.99 Like Birkinshaw et al., they view headquarters 
relocation on a spectrum, rather than as a binary variable. They 
differentiate between “full, partial or virtual” relocation of 
headquarters.100 They define each as follows: 
Full relocation means that the entire top management group and 
all HQ functions are moved. Partial HQ relocation signifies that 
only selected members of the top management group and 
functions are transferred. Virtual relocation refers to situations 
in which HQ management responsibilities are handled through 
frequent travel and modern IT support systems.101 
They find that multiple factors may drive meaningful relocations, and 
that such drivers may be highly contextualized.102 
Unfortunately, as explained below,103 public-finance researchers who 
have studied MNCs’ tax-residence decisions have viewed relocations of 
headquarters as a binary variable. This limits the policy implications of 
their studies. 
2. Revisiting the Policy Implications of Inversions Literature 
The Article now turns to question the policy implications of empirical 
research on inversions against the backdrop of organizational literature 
96. Id. at 689. 
97. Id. at 697. 
98. Id. at 690. 
99. Wilhelm Barner-Rasmussen, Rebecca Piekkarim, & Ingmar Björkman, Mobility of 
Headquarters in Multinational Corporations, 1 EUR. J. INT’L MGMT. 260 (2007). 
100. Id. at 263. 
101. Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
102. Birkinshaw et al., supra note 8, at 697 (discussing factors that may drive different types of 
dislocations in various contexts). 
103. See infra Part II.B.2. 
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discussed above. Inversions researchers suggest that jurisdictions should 
present MNCs with a competitive tax environment for headquarters 
locations, and that noncompetitive jurisdictions risk losing important 
economic attributes. This policy implication is not, however, supported 
by these researchers’ empirical findings. 
For example, in Voget’s study, relocation occurs “when a headquarter 
firm sells its assets to a foreign company or alternatively when the firm’s 
shareholders sell their shares to a foreign company in exchange for 
shares or for cash.”104 This means that Voget’s empirical findings only 
explain how tax may affect the nominal change of ownership of stock or 
assets. Voget’s study offers no insight into the effects of taxes on 
locational decisions of meaningful headquarters functions. Using Desai’s 
terminology, Voget studies the effect of taxes on legal or tax 
relocations.105 Such relocations interest policymakers due to the 
associated loss of the corporate tax base. However, legal dislocations do 
not necessarily entail the dislocation of economically significant 
attributes (contrary to what Voget suggests). 
The Huizinga and Voget study on post-merger structure assumes that 
“[f]or tax purposes, the newly created multinational is resident in the 
acquiring or parent country.”106 However, such locational decision 
means little in terms of where the relevant management attributes are. 
Tax residence and the residence of managerial talent are two different 
attributes. For example, when the U.S.-based Eaton Corporation inverted 
in 2012 by merging with the Irish corporation Cooper Industries, the 
post-merger parent company (“New Eaton”) was indeed located in 
Ireland (a low-tax jurisdiction),107 in line with Huizinga and Voget’s 
prediction. However, in its offering documents, Eaton stated that “The 
New Eaton senior management team after the acquisition and the merger 
will be the same as the current senior management team of Eaton.”108 In 
other words, the merged corporation, notwithstanding the fact that it is 
incorporated in Ireland, seems to be substantively managed from the 
104. Voget, supra note 3, at 1069. 
105. Supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text. 
106. Huizinga & Voget, supra note 72, at 1226. 
107. For 2012, Ireland’s corporate tax rate was 12.5%. See OECD Tax Database, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/tax-database.htm#C_CorporateCaptial [hereinafter: OECD Tax 
Database]. 
108. Eaton Corp., Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (Schedule 14A) 100 (Sept. 14, 2012). In addition, according to Eaton’s 2013 annual report 
(namely, at the end of the first full fiscal year following the transaction), all eleven board members 
were U.S. nationals. See EATON CORP., ANNUAL REPORT 22 (2013). 
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U.S.109 This is inconsistent with Huizinga and Voget’s policy argument 
according to which high taxes may affect dislocation of meaningful 
management attributes. To be sure, it is possible that this is indeed the 
case, but Huizinga and Voget’s study provides no empirical support for 
such argument. Because of their definition of dependent variables, all 
their study does is to explain the effect of taxes on nominal structuring 
decisions. 
Laaman, Simula, and Torstila’s definition of relocation is similarly 
problematic.110 Interestingly, they note the fact that the headquarters 
relocation is a matter of degree, citing Barner-Rasmussen, Piekkari, and 
Bjorkman.111 Nonetheless, they explicitly choose to study virtual 
relocations, ignoring that such relocations may not be associated with 
relocation of meaningful attributes. They define headquarters relocation 
“as the legal transfer of a firm’s corporate or regional HQ from one 
country to another.”112 They explicitly “do not require that even the top 
management team itself would have to move to the new HQ location.”113 
It is therefore surprising that given their methodological choice of virtual 
relocation as their dependent variable, they suggest that such relocations 
may have meaningful economic effects.114 
To summarize, in formulating policy implications, current inversion 
literature assumes that MNCs’ tax-residence overlaps with the place of 
all the meaningful management attributes that create positive effects in 
the local economy. Organizational studies do not support this 
assumption and the empirical inversions research does not test it. The 
most sanguine reading of empirical literature on inversions would only 
support the conclusion that in response to high taxes, MNCs may engage 
in tax planning (such as a scheme to change tax-residence). From a 
policy-making point of view, that is not an interesting argument. 
109. Conceivably, the entire management team could have moved to Ireland. However, this 
would be material information the disclosure of which is required under securities laws. In the 
absence of such disclosure, the assumption is that no corporate officers moved to Ireland in 
connection with the inversion. 
110. Laamanen, Simula, & Torstila, supra note 3. 
111. Id. at 189. 
112. Id. (emphasis added).  
113. Id. 
114. Interestingly, Laaman, Simula, and Torstila observe that actual move of managers “would 
seem to be the case in most relocations.” Id. They do not provide support for such an assertion. The 
case studies explored herein suggest to the contrary, namely that managers rarely move for tax 
reasons alone. Rather, following tax-driven inversions managements perform minimal functions 
(such as board meetings) in the new jurisdictions, in order to assure that the new tax-residence is 
respected. However, in most cases they continue to reside and operate their daily business in the old 
jurisdiction. See discussion on Virtual Relocations from a CMC Jurisdiction, infra Part IV.B.3. 
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Rational taxpayers will always attempt to reduce their tax burdens by 
using available tax-planning schemes. 
Obviously, it is still possible that tax-residence planning is associated 
with distorted capital allocations, causing meaningful effects. There is 
no question that taxation influences decisions about where to locate 
capital.115 However, inversion studies do not show that to be the case in 
the context of MNC relocations. In fact, some studies imply to the 
contrary. A 2010 study by Kimberly Clausing did not find a strong 
relationship between the registered location of Fortune 500 firms and 
meaningful R&D activities that are usually associated with headquarters 
locations.116 Similarly, a study by Bandik, Gorg, and Karpaty did not 
find a decline in the level of R&D activity in Sweden following 
acquisition of Swedish corporations by foreign-owned MNCs.117 
3. Inversions Literature Excludes Many Meaningful Relocations 
There is an additional shortcoming stemming from the fact that legal 
(or virtual) relocation is the dependent variable in empirical inversion 
studies. By defining relocation based on tax-residence, inversion studies 
exclude from their sample many meaningful relocations that are not 
accompanied by a change of tax-residence. 
For example, in 2004, Nokia—the Finnish communications giant—
established a corporate office in New York by substantively moving the 
corporate CFO office and other key corporate management functions 
from Espoo, Finland to New York.118 At the time of the announcement 
of the relocation, Nokia expected the New York headquarters to employ 
approximately 100 to 150 people.119 This move was not accompanied by 
the change of the tax-residence. Nokia’s parent entity is tax-resident in 
Finland to this day. Since inversion studies define relocation based on 
the change of tax residence, all corporate headquarters moves that are 
not associated with a change in tax residence, such as Nokia’s, are 
excluded from their samples. The result is that such studies overstate the 
effects of taxation on virtual headquarters moves, and do not necessarily 
address the effects of taxation on meaningful headquarters moves. 
115. See Devereux, supra note 2. 
116. Clausing, supra note 4, at 756–60. 
117. Roger Bandick, Holger Gorg & Patrik Karpaty, Foreign Acquisitions, Domestic 
Multinationals, and R&D, 116 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 1091 (2014). 
118. Press Release, Nokia to Establish a New Corporate Office in the New York Metropolitan 
Area (Dec. 17, 2003), available at http://company.nokia.com/en/news/press-releases/2003/12/17/ 
nokia-to-establish-a-new-corporate-office-in-the-new-york-metropolitan-area. 
119. Id. 
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4. Inversions and Frictions 
To this point, the Article has demonstrated the shortcomings of 
inversions literature. Current research does not support the argument that 
taxing MNCs based on the location of their headquarters may cause 
meaningful loss of economic attributes. Moreover, literature on tax 
frictions possibly points to a different outcome. 
Frictions are generically defined as “transaction costs incurred in the 
marketplace that make implementation of certain tax planning strategies 
costly.”120 Frictions present a powerful tool for tax-writers. A successful 
tax-law design in this context will create significant unavoidable non-tax 
costs on unwanted tax planning,121 without deterring desired behavior.122 
When an MNC’s Chief Executive Officer considers an inversion, she 
must weigh the expected tax benefit associated with restructuring as a 
foreign corporation, against the possible non-tax cost of such 
restructuring. For example, if all that is required in order to “lose” tax 
residence is to reincorporate in a foreign jurisdiction, there is little non-
tax cost to consider.123 Reincorporation itself is almost costless, and 
unlikely to require any substantive changes to business operations. In 
such a case, there is no significant friction deterring the inversion, and 
opportunistic tax-planning is expected. 
On the other hand, if, in order to lose the tax residence, it is necessary 
to relocate management, assets, and other operations overseas, the non-
tax cost of inverting becomes significant. The cost stems not only from 
the significant expenses associated with having to move people and 
assets overseas, but also from the possible loss of the benefits of 
operating in the old jurisdiction. For example, there might be a good 
business reason for management to be geographically close to the 
MNC’s most significant customer base. Thus, moving management to a 
new jurisdiction entails certain entrepreneurial risks that may not justify 
the tax savings. In such a context, the MNC’s preferences regarding its 
120. MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 13, at 9. 
121. Schizer, supra note 12, at 1325 (“In sum, end runs are unlikely if, in changing the 
transaction to avoid the reform, the taxpayer or an irreplaceable counterparty would suffer a 
dramatic and unavoidable decline in utility, and this cost would exceed the tax benefit at issue.”). 
122. See Osofsky, supra note 12, at 1072–73. 
123. There might be a cost associated with having to operate under a corporate-law regime (that 
of the new jurisdiction) that is not as developed as the one of the old jurisdiction. However, it 
should be rather easy to find a jurisdiction with comparable corporate laws, or to contract around 
undesired laws. In such a case, there is no significant non-tax friction that serves as a deterrent for 
inversion. For a discussion of corporate charter competition as a possible source of friction, see 
Kane & Rock, supra note 89. 
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business operations serve as a friction that may deter the inversion.124 If, 
however, a new customer base develops overseas, it may make sense to 
move management regardless of tax, and thus tax-law does not prevent 
the restructuring. 
Friction literature thus points to an outcome that is possibly contrary 
to the one claimed by empirical inversions literature. Namely, frictions 
suggest that having corporate tax residence attached to substantive 
attributes may prevent inversions, rather than cause the dislocation of the 
substantive attributes. Identifying the types of attributes that are less 
susceptible to dislocation may provide policymakers with a toolbox to 
address the inversions problem. 
III. A CASE STUDY APPROACH TO HOME COUNTRY 
EFFECTS OF CORPORATE INVERSIONS 
One of the main shortcomings of current inversion literature is the 
lack of a cohesive theoretical connection between the empirical findings 
(which this Article does not dispute) and their proposed policy 
implications. Particularly, current literature ignores the need to balance 
the tax benefit of an inversion against the costs associated with 
relocation of real corporate attributes. This Article attempts to fill this 
theoretical gap by developing a framework for the description of 
meaningful home-country effects that may be associated with corporate 
inversions. Part III.A explains how case study research may address the 
shortcomings in current literature, introduces the case studies selected 
and explains the method of analysis. Part III.B summarizes the findings. 
A. Method and Case Selection 
In order to deduce testable constructs that describe the meaningful 
effects of inversions, it is not enough to look at nominal loss of tax 
residence as current literature has done. There is a need for an 
explorative task, aimed at unearthing meaningful changes that 
policymakers may care about. For such a task, case study research is 
particularly well-suited.125 Such strategy “focuses on understanding the 
dynamics present within single settings,”126 which in the case of this 
124. See Schizer, supra note 12, at 1326–27 (describing business preferences as a powerful 
friction). 
125. Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Building Theories from Case Study Research, 14 ACAD. MGMT. 
REV. 532 (1989).  
126. Id. at 534. 
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Article is an inversion transaction. The idea is to identify observable 
“themes, concepts, and possibly even relationships between 
variables,”127 and use such observations to offer constructs to guide 
future research. Future research may negate or support such constructs. 
This Article studies the substantive home country effects of five 
inversions of large MNCs.128 The case studies represent inversions that 
may reasonably be perceived to cause negative consequences in the 
home jurisdictions. Each case study examines an inverted company that 
is well-known in its home jurisdiction, and is a significant player in the 
company’s relevant industry segment. In such cases, the loss of such 
company can reasonably be perceived to result in significant 
consequences. The case studies selected are aimed, however, at 
generating a sample of inversions that vary in their legal, jurisdictional 
and commercial characteristics. This is in order to try to articulate, in 
policy-relevant terms, the meaningful relocations that commonly take 
place in the specific context of inversions. The following characteristics 
are considered: the jurisdictions involved (both home and target 
jurisdiction); the tax system in each jurisdiction (territorial systems 
versus worldwide systems); tax-residence determination in each 
jurisdiction (CMC versus POI); and industry segment of the inverted 
MNC. 
The Article only explores inversions from one industrialized nation to 
another.129 The assumption is that inversions involving pure tax havens 
are unlikely to entail dislocation of real economic attributes, since tax 
havens are not positioned to support such attributes.130 Indeed, it has 
been shown that tax havens are not expected to divert real economic 
activity from non-haven jurisdictions.131 The characteristics of the 
transactions studied are summarized in Table 1. 
  
127. Id. at 541. 
128. It is generally accepted that a minimum of four case studies and a maximum of ten is the 
desired range of grounded-theory research. See Eisenhardt, supra note 125, at 545.  
129. Relocations within jurisdictions or to small tax-havens are not explored. 
130. Tax Havens are usually small countries, in population and area. See Dhammika Armapala & 
James R. Hines Jr., Which Countries Become Tax Havens?, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 1058 (2009). As such, 
tax havens probably lack infrastructure to support physical investment attributes of scale.  
131. Mihir Desai, C. Fritz Foley & James R. Hines, Jr., Do Tax Havens Divert Economic Activity, 
90 ECON. LETTERS 219, 221 (2006) (concluding that “tax havens do not appear to divert activity 
from non-havens”).  
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Table 1 – Characteristics of Corporate Inversion Case Studies 
Inverting 
corporation 
Year 
comple-
ted 
(fiscal) 
Home 
jurisdiction 
Target 
jurisdiction 
Home 
jurisdiction tax 
characteristics 
(tax system; 
residence 
determination) 
Target 
jurisdiction tax 
characteristics 
(tax system; 
residence 
determination) 
Industry of 
inverting 
corporation 
Shire 
Pharmac-
euticals 
2008 UK Ireland Worldwide; CMC 
Worldwide; 
CMC 
Pharmac-
euticals 
Wolseley 
PLC 2011 UK 
Switzer-
land 
Territorial; 
CMC 
Territorial; 
POEM132 
Building 
materials 
Nobel 
Biocare 2002 Sweden 
Switzer-
land 
Worldwide; 
POI 
Territorial; 
POEM 
Dental 
implants 
News 
Corporati
on 
2004 Australia USA Worldwide; CMC 
Worldwide; 
POI Media 
Tim 
Hortons 2009 USA Canada 
Worldwide; 
POI Mixed; CMC 
Food 
chain 
 
Changes in the home country are explored at two points in time: 
immediately after the inversion (meaning, at the end of the fiscal year in 
which the inversion took effect) and a year after the inversion (meaning 
the end of the first full fiscal after the year of inversion). The assumption 
is that by the end of the full year after the inversion, changes that are 
directly attributable to the inversion have already taken effect. Of course, 
it is possible that changes attributable to the inversion can be observed in 
the long term, but the Article refrains from such inquiry. For long post-
inversion periods it should prove difficult to isolate the effects of 
inversions from other factors, such as external economic effects or a 
change in business strategy. 
This Article uses numerous data sources to identify changes in the 
home jurisdiction. Company filings and press releases are used in order 
132. PEOM stands for the Place of Effective Management. In most cases, POEM is the same as 
CMC. See HM Revenue & Customs, INTM 120210—Company Residence: Guidance Originally 
Published in the International Tax Handbook, § ITH348 (2010), available at 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/intmanual/intm120210.htm#IDA1ORZF (explaining the apparent 
differences between CMC and POEM and concluding that “it is not that easy to divorce effective 
management from central management and control and in the vast majority of cases they will be 
located in the same place”). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(“OECD”) defines POEM as “the place where key management and commercial decisions that are 
necessary for the conduct of the entity’s business as a whole are in substance made.” See OECD 
COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL, C-(4)8 
(2010), available at http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/model-tax-
convention-on-income-and-oncapital-2010_9789264175181-en. 
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to articulate the drivers to, as well as the structure of, each inversion 
transaction. Annual reports are used as qualitative sources describing 
MNCs’ substantive operations both before and after the inversions. This 
Article also draws from investigative reporting by reputable news outlets 
that looked into the nature of MNCs’ operations both before and after an 
inversion. 
This Article also explores some quantitative data from companies’ 
public filings. Specifically, to the extent available, the Article 
investigates financial segment reporting. MNCs are required to 
separately report financial data for “material” geographic segments.133 
Often the home jurisdiction from which an MNC inverts is its historical 
home, which is usually a material market for the MNC operations. The 
home jurisdiction is therefore reported as a separate segment. Changes in 
that segment occurring after the inversion may provide useful insights. 
Unfortunately, the breadth of information contained in segment 
reporting varies depending on the jurisdiction in which the MNCs’ 
securities are listed for trade, as well as on each MNC’s accounting 
practices. However, all include, at a minimum, the book value of long-
lived assets (i.e., assets that provide the company with benefits 
extending beyond the current fiscal year) and gross revenues in each 
material segment. Some MNCs also report capital expenditures and the 
number of employees in the geographical segment note. Even if not 
reported in the segment note, most MNCs’ annual reports contain a 
breakdown of the number of employees in each geographical segment. 
Multiple data sources are used to study possible changes of 
management composition following an inversion. Annual reports are 
used to study management composition before and after the inversion 
and to understand the reasons for any observed change in composition. 
Nationality of board members is taken from the ICC Directors database 
as well as other sources (such as annual reports of other firms in which 
management members hold positions, and sometimes LinkedIn profiles 
of management members). 
Finally, all historical corporate tax rates are taken from the OECD 
Tax Database.134 
133. 17 C.F.R § 229.101(d) (2014). For a discussion of the relationship between segments 
reporting and tax planning, see Herita T. Akamah, Ole-Kristian Hope & Wayne B. Thomas, Tax 
Haven and Disclosure Aggregation 2 (Rotman Sch of Mgmt. Working Paper No. 2419573, 2014) 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2419573 (the authors find that 
MNCs that are aggressive in their tax planning tend to aggregate segments, meaning, providing 
lower-quality disclosure).  
134. OECD Tax Database, supra note 107. 
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The findings are narratively discussed immediately below. Some 
stylized facts are presented in tables following the discussion of each 
case study. 
B. Results: Inversion Case Studies 
1. Shire Pharmaceuticals’ 2008 Move from UK to Ireland 
Shire PLC (“Shire”) is a large MNC specializing in the development, 
manufacturing, and sale of pharmaceuticals. It is a dual-listed company, 
with securities traded on both the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and 
NASDAQ. 
Shire was founded in 1986 in the UK (“Old Shire”) and was 
headquartered in Basingstoke, UK, for both tax and business purposes 
until April 2008, when it announced its intention to change its tax-
residence to Ireland.135 Under the inversion plan, a new holding 
company, Shire Limited (“New Shire”), was registered in the Isle of 
Jersey, a tax haven.136 New Shire “operational headquarters” as well as 
tax-residence were to be located in Ireland.137 Shareholders of Old Shire 
received shares of New Shire on a one-for-one basis, and New Shire 
became the publicly traded entity.138 The inversion was completed in 
late May 2008.139 
Prior to announcing the inversion plan, Old Shire had significant 
presence in both the U.S. and the UK but very limited presence in 
Ireland. Shire’s board of executives was composed of four U.S. nationals 
(including the Chairman, as well as the Chief Executive Officer), five 
British nationals (including the Chief Financial Officer), and one French 
national. Shire did not have a significant Irish investor base. Of its three 
largest shareholders, none were Irish.140 
Shire’s operations in Ireland were also insignificant compared to 
other geographical regions. For example, as of December 31, 2007, 
135. Press Release, Shire PLC, Shire to Introduce a New UK Listed Holding Company (Apr. 15, 
2008), available at http://www.shire.com/shireplc/uploads/press/NEWUKLISTEDHOLDING 
COMPANY15Apr2008.pdf [hereinafter Shire’s Press Release].  
136. See JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, TAX HAVENS: INTERNATIONAL 
TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 4 (2013) (listing the Isle of Jersey as a tax haven). 
137. See Shire’s Press Release, supra note 135. 
138. Id. 
139. Shire PLC, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 38 (Feb. 27, 2009) [hereinafter Shire 2008 10-K] 
(noting the inversion was completed on May 23, 2008). 
140. PROSPECTUS, SHIRE LTD., INTRODUCTION OF UP TO 700,000,000 ORDINARY SHARES OF 5 
PENCE EACH TO THE OFFICIAL LIST 11 (Apr. 16, 2008) [hereinafter SHIRE’S PROSPECTUS]. 
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Shire employed 3346 personnel, of whom seventy-four percent were 
based in the United States and thirteen percent were based in the UK.141 
Shire had only fifty-five employees in Ireland (about 1.6% of its global 
workforce), primarily in sales and marketing operations.142 The Irish 
employees were based in a 16,000 square foot office complex in Dublin, 
which accounted for about one percent of the total area of Shire’s 
principal properties worldwide.143 For comparison, Shire’s UK principal 
properties covered an area of 67,000 square feet, and Shire’s principal 
properties in the U.S. covered an area of 1,005,000 square feet, or about 
ninety percent of Shire’s reported principal properties. The U.S. 
properties included all of Shire’s principal manufacturing, research and 
technology centers. 
According to Shire’s geographical segment reporting,144 most of its 
long-lived assets were located in the North America ($294.8 million of a 
total of $368.6 million, or about eighty percent). Seventy-four percent of 
its gross revenues were also produced in the U.S. ($1798.2 million of a 
total of $2436.3 million). The UK was the second largest segment, 
where nineteen percent of the long-lived assets were located and seven 
percent of the revenues were generated. 
Prior to the inversion, Ireland was not reported as a separate 
geographical segment, supporting the conclusion that it was not 
significant for Shire’s operations in general. Indeed, as of December 31, 
2007, Shire had only $1 million of long-lived assets in Ireland (less than 
one percent of Shire’s worldwide long-lived assets), and it generated less 
than one percent of its worldwide revenues in Ireland. 
To summarize, Ireland had no significant role in Shire’s global 
operations prior to the inversion, and therefore agglomeration effects 
cannot have possibly played a significant role in Shire’s decision to 
move to Ireland. Rather, the move was completely tax driven. In its 
press release announcing the inversion, Shire stated that given the 
group’s international operations “Shire has concluded that its business 
and its shareholders would be better served by having an international 
holding company with a group structure that is designed to help protect 
141. SHIRE PLC, ANNUAL REPORT 32 (2007) [hereinafter SHIRE 2007 ANNUAL REPORT]. 
142. Salamander Davoudi & Andrew Jack, Shire Deals Blow to UK as It Moves Tax Domicile to 
Ireland, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2008, 3:00 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/051e289c-0b4c-
11dd-8ccf-0000779fd2ac.html. 
143. All of the data about Shire’s 2007 principal properties is taken from Shire’s Prospectus, 
supra note 140, at 298. 
144. For Shire’s geographical segment reporting data, see SHIRE PLC, ANNUAL REPORT 115–17 
(2008) [hereinafter SHIRE 2008 ANNUAL REPORT]. 
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the group’s taxation position, and better facilitate the group’s financial 
management.”145 
Shire’s effective tax rate for 2007 was rather low, at 11.9%.146 
However, Shire’s effective tax rates for 2006 and 2005 were quite 
substantial, at 26.8% and 27.5%, respectively.147 Shire did not disclose 
the expected effect of the inversion on the group’s effective tax rate. 
However, the incentive to adopt Irish tax residence in lieu of the UK one 
was rather obvious: At the time, the UK tax system was a worldwide 
system, meaning that a resident UK MNC was subject to tax in the UK 
on its worldwide income.148 The UK corporate income tax was 
substantial, at thirty percent.149 This created an incentive for UK MNCs 
to “lose” their UK tax residence (in which case they would only be taxed 
in the UK on income derived from sources within the UK) and establish 
residence in a lower-tax jurisdiction. While Ireland was also a 
worldwide tax jurisdiction, Ireland’s corporate tax rate at the time was 
12.5%.150 
Under UK law, tax-residence of corporations is determined based on 
two alternative tests: the POI, or the CMC.151 The satisfaction of either 
would result in UK tax-residency. This means that in order to “lose” its 
UK tax-residence Shire had to take a two-step approach. First, it had to 
reincorporate some place other than the UK. This is rather easy to 
achieve, and indeed, Shire had changed its place of incorporation to the 
Isle of Jersey, a tax haven.152 
Second, Shire had to change its place of central management and 
control. Changing the place of central management and control may 
seem more challenging. Under UK law, the place of central management 
is, broadly speaking, the place where the highest level of control of the 
business of the company is directed.153 Presumably then, managers 
145. Shire’s Press Release, supra note 135 (emphasis added). 
146. In fact, the rate in 2007 was negative 4.0%. The 11.9% figure excludes the impact of a one-
time charge made in respect of a specific investment. See Shire PLC, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 
53 (Feb. 25, 2007) [hereinafter Shire 2007 10-K]. 
147. Id. at 60. 
148. The UK changed its system from worldwide to territorial in July of 2009. See infra note 185 
and accompanying discussion.  
149. Historical Corporate Tax Rates are taken from the OECD Tax Database, supra note 107. 
150. Id. 
151. HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL 
ANALYSIS 435 (3d ed. 2010). 
152. See supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text. 
153. Christiana HJI Panayi, United Kingdom, in RESIDENCE OF COMPANIES UNDER TAX 
TREATIES AND EC LAW 817, 826–27 (Guglielmo Maisto ed., 2009). 
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would actually have to move someplace else, dislocating real 
management attributes, in order for Shire to “lose” its UK status. This is 
the type of behavioral incentive that opponents of the Real Seat tests are 
worried about. Indeed, when discussing the planned inversion, Shire’s 
CEO explicitly differentiated Shire’s planned inversion from naked 
inversions that were common practice in the U.S. in the early 2000s. He 
explained: “[t]he era of paper transactions and occasional board 
meetings in order to have intellectual property in the Caymans, Bermuda 
and the Bahamas has ended, with a shift to substance over form.”154 This 
strongly implies that a real, economically significant move would have 
had to take place in order to shift Shire’s tax-residence. 
However, in stark contrast to such a story, Shire took great care to 
assure its various stakeholders that no substantive changes were 
expected to take place as a result of the inversion. Shire assured its 
shareholders that “[t]he new holding company . . . will have the same 
Board and management team as [Old] Shire and there will be no 
substantive changes to corporate governance and investor protection 
measures.”155 Shire also stated that the inversion “will not result in any 
changes in the day to day conduct of Shire’s business.”156 
Indeed, Shire’s board composition hardly changed following the 
inversion. While some personnel changes have occurred, the national 
composition of board members remained largely the same. Following 
the inversion, Shire’s board included four Americans (including the 
Chairman), five British nationals (including the CEO as well as the 
CFO), and one French national, just as before the inversion. The 
following year (2009), two American and one British board members 
left, and one American has been appointed. In other words, British 
residents maintained majority in Shire’s board. 
While Shire had to have its central management and control in Ireland 
in order to have gained residence there, not a single board member 
moved to Ireland, nor was any Irish board member appointed. An 
investigation by the Guardian newspaper into Shire’s post-inversion 
operations suggested that as of February 2009, Shire had approximately 
seventy employees in its Dublin office (about two percent of its global 
workforce), none of whom were involved in the “central management” 
of Shire.157 For comparison, Shire’s UK headquarters employed a staff 
154. Davoudi & Jack, supra note 142. 
155. Shire’s Press Release, supra note 135. 
156. Id. 
157. Tax Gap Reporting Team, Tracking Down the Addresses of the Irish Headquarters, THE 
GUARDIAN, Feb. 10, 2009, at 13. 
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of 300 at the time.158 It therefore seems that at the strategic corporate 
level, the relocation has been completely virtual. 
Given that both the UK and Ireland determine the place of residence 
based on the central management and control test, this seems odd. How 
is it that no significant dislocation of corporate-level functions can be 
observed in the UK following Shire’s inversion? The answer seems to be 
that Shire felt comfortable that its place of central management and 
control would be based in the place of board meetings.159 The place of 
board meetings is viewed as having an important (even if not 
determinative) role in concluding where the place of central 
management is.160 Indeed, Shire instituted a $9271 budget to support 
executives’ travels for board meetings in Ireland.161 Of the five board 
meetings that took place in the year following the inversion, three took 
place in Ireland, and two in the U.S. It appears that three board meetings 
were enough to substantiate tax-residence in Ireland.162 
An examination of Shire’s geographical segment reporting and annual 
reports tells a similar story.163 In the years following the inversion, the 
bulk of Shire’s work force remained in North America, with about 
seventy-two and seventy-three percent of the work force employed there 
in 2008 and 2009 respectively (compared to seventy-three percent before 
the inversion). The UK workforce also maintained its size. Prior to the 
inversion, Shire employed 458 employees in the UK (thirteen percent of 
the global work force). It employed 452 and 465 employees in the UK in 
2008 and 2009 respectively (twelve percent of the global workforce for 
both 2008 and 2009). 
Following the inversion, Shire’s only principal property in Ireland 
remained the same 16,000 square feet office complex in Dublin.164 
Shire’s occupation of properties in the UK did not suffer a loss, and even 
158. Id. 
159. See SHIRE 2008 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 141, at 45 (“In this regard the Board noted that 
as Shire is tax resident in Ireland it is obligated to hold all its Board meetings outside the UK, and as 
such there will always be an element of travel time before it can hold an urgent ad hoc.”). 
160. Panayi, supra note 153, at 830.  
161. SHIRE 2008 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 144, at 59 (“In addition, to recognize the travel 
required for Directors to attend meetings in Ireland or the US, a $9,271 travel allowance was 
instituted for travel exceeding four hours.”). 
162. Id. 
163. For Shire’s geographical segment reporting see, supra note 144.  
164. All of the data about Shire’s principal properties is taken from the following sources: For 
2007, Shire 2007 10-K, supra note 146, at 3510-K; for 2008, SHIRE 2008 10-K, supra note 139, at 
36; for 2009, Shire PLC, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 35 (Feb. 26, 2009) [hereinafter Shire 2009 10-
K]. 
 
                                                     
04 - Marian_final.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/13/2015  11:46 AM 
32 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1 
increased following the inversion. The area covered by Shire-reported 
principal properties in the UK in 2008 increased to 88,500 square feet, 
and increased in 2009 to 148,000 square feet. Most of Shire’s occupied 
properties remained in the U.S. (1,039,000 square feet in 2009). All of 
Shire’s main research and manufacturing facilities remained in the U.S. 
until the end of 2009, as was the case prior to the inversion. 
North America also remained the location of most of Shire’s long-
lived assets (eighty-seven percent, representing an increase of about 
seven percent for both 2008 and 2009) and gross revenues (seventy-six 
percent and seventy-one percent in 2008 and 2009 respectively). The 
UK remained the second most significant geographical segment with 
eleven percent and twelve percent of the long-lived assets in 2008 and 
2009 respectively and five percent of the revenues in both years. In 
nominal terms, in the year of the inversion the U.K. assets decreased by 
$7.2 million, but in the following year UK assets increased to a level 
higher than before the inversion. In terms of their proportional part of 
Shire’s global assets, the UK has seen a decrease from seventeen to 
eleven percent in both 2008 and 2009. Ireland remained marginal with 
less than one percent of both long-lived assets and gross revenues. 
It is therefore clear that, from the UK’s perspective, the only result of 
Shire’s inversion to Ireland was the loss of the UK tax-base. There were 
no overall noteworthy changes, positive or negative, to Shire’s economic 
activities in the UK. One report summarized that Shire was able to move 
to Ireland (for tax purposes) with “[n]o change to strategy. No change to 
dividend policy. No staff relocation or job losses.”165 
Some of the geographical data of Shire’s global activities before and 
after the inversion are summarized in Table 2. UK, the home country 
from which Shire inverted, is highlighted. 
  
165. Andrew Hill, Shire’s Shift in Tax Residency Is a Warning to the UK, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 15, 
2008, 8:07 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/035ff9f2-0b1c-11dd-8ccf-0000779fd2ac.html.  
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Table 2 – Summary of Shire’s activity by geographical segment before and after the 
inversion  
 2007 2008 (Inversion 
announced and 
completed) 
2009 
Board 
Members’ 
Nationality  
   
American 4 4 3 
British  5166 5 4 
French 1 1 1 
Total 10 10 8 
Employees167    
UK 458 (13%) 452 (12%) 465 (12%) 
North America 2,533 (74%) 2,714 (72%) 2,829 (73%) 
Rest of the world 445(13%) 603(16%) 581(15%) 
Total 3,436 (100%) 3,769 (100%) 3,875 (100%) 
Ireland168 55169 (2%) not reported 70170 (2%) 
Properties  
(sq. ft.) 171 
   
UK 67,000 (6%); 
Basingstoke, UK, 
Global HQ 
88,500 (8%); 
Basingstoke, UK, UK 
HQ 
148,000 (9%); 
Basingstoke, UK, UK 
HQ 
US 1,005,000 (90%); 
Offices, 
manufacturing, 
research and 
distribution facilities 
1,039,000 (91%); 
Offices, manufacturing, 
research and 
distribution facilities 
1,357,000 (86%); 
Offices, manufacturing, 
research and 
distribution facilities 
Ireland  16,000 (1%); office 
space 
16,000 (1%); Dublin, 
Ireland—Global HQ 
16,000 (1%); Dublin, 
Ireland—Global HQ 
Canada 34,000 (3%); office 
space 
Not reported 35,000 (2%); office 
space 
166. One non-executive director who lived in London in the relevant period is counted as British, 
though she possibly holds U.S. citizenship. 
167. These figures are taken from Shire’s respective annual reports for 2007, 2008, and 2009. 
168. The number of Irish employees is taken from the Tax Gap Reporting Team, supra note 157. 
While Ireland was reported as a separate segment in Shire’s annual reports, Irish employees were 
not reported separately. It is therefore possible that such employees are included in the UK figures. 
169. Supra note 142. 
170. This figure was current as of February 2009. See Tax Gap Reporting Team, supra note 157. 
171. The data for Shire’s occupied properties is taken from the following sources: Shire 2007 10-
K, supra note 146, at 3510-K; Shire 2008 10-K, supra note 139, at 3610-K; Shire 2009 10-K, supra 
note 164, at 3610-K. 
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Germany Not reported Not reported 16,500 (1%); office 
space 
Brazil Not reported Not reported 14,000 (1%); office 
space 
Total 1,122,000 (100%) 1,143,500 (100%) 1,585,500 (100%) 
Long Lived 
Assets ($ 
million) 
   
Ireland 1.4 (<1%) 1.0 (<1%) 0.7 (<1%) 
UK 68.8 (19%) 61.6 (11%) 79.5 (12%) 
North America 294.8 (80%) 468.6 (87%) 593.5 (87%) 
Rest of the 
World 
3.6 (1%) 6.6 (1%) 6.9 (1%) 
Total 368.6 (100%) 537.8 (100%) 680.6 (100%) 
Gross Revenues 
($ million) 
   
Ireland 16.2 (1%) 17.8 (1%) 19.5 (1%) 
UK 177 (7%) 160 (5%) 163.9 (5%) 
North America 1798.2 (74%) 2299.6 (76%) 2141.3 (71%) 
Rest of the 
World 
444.9 (18%) 544.8 (18%) 683 (23%) 
Total 2436.3 (100%) 3022.2 (100%) 3007.7 (100%) 
 
2. Wolseley PLC’s 2010 Move from the UK to Switzerland 
Wolseley PLC (“Wolseley”) is the world’s largest distributor of 
heating and plumbing products to professional contractors and a leading 
supplier of building materials to the professional market.172 Its shares are 
traded on the LSE. Wolseley was founded in 1887 in Australia,173 and 
moved to England in 1889.174 
On September 27, 2010, Old Wolseley announced its intention to 
“create a new Group holding company which will be UK listed, 
incorporated in Jersey and will have tax residence in Switzerland (‘New 
Wolseley’).”175 Under the plan, New Wolseley issued ordinary shares to 
172. Our Story, WOLSELEY PLC, http://www.wolseley.com/index.asp?pageid=177 (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2015). 
173. History, WOLSELEY PLC, http://www.wolseley.com/index.asp?pageid=24&year=1880 (last 
visited Jan 15, 2015). 
174. Id. 
175. Wolseley to Introduce a New UK Listed Holding Company, WOLSELEY PLC, 
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holders of Old Wolseley shares on a one-for-one basis in exchange for 
the cancellation of their Old Wolseley shares.176 The result was that Old 
Wolseley became a subsidiary of New Wolseley, a Swiss corporation for 
tax purposes. The plan took effect in late 2010.177 Since Wolseley’s 
fiscal year ends on July 31, the inversion took effect in the 2011 tax 
year. 
Wolseley’s strategic affiliation with Switzerland was not obvious 
prior to the inversion, though Wolseley did have some operations there. 
Wolseley’s executive board consisted of nine British nationals 
(including the Chairman, the CEO and the CFO), one American, and one 
French. Wolseley also did not have a significant investor base in 
Switzerland. On its annual report for 2010, Wolseley reported six 
shareholders who have held substantial interests, none of which were 
Swiss (though the second largest shareholder, with holdings of about 
5.17% of Wolseley share capital, was a hedge fund with offices in, 
among other places, Zurich).178 
Prior to announcing the inversion plan, U.S. employees accounted for 
thirty-five percent of Old Wolseley’s global workforce (17,108 
employees out of a total number of 48,226, employed in 1241 branches 
out of a total of 4118). UK accounted for twenty-two percent (10,544 
employees in 1486 branches), France eighteen percent (8831 
employees), and the Nordic countries for thirteen percent (6468 
employees). The Central European segment (which included 
Switzerland) had 2591 employees, accounting for about five percent of 
the global workforce.179 
Segment reporting also demonstrates Wolseley’s non-strategic 
affiliation to Switzerland. Rather, the U.S. was Wolseley’s largest 
geographical segment. The U.S. accounted for thirty-three percent of 
Wolseley’s long lived assets180 (£2304 million of a total of £7058 
million), the UK accounted for seventeen percent, and the Nordic 
jurisdictions accounted for twenty-five percent. Other significant 
geographical segments in terms of assets were France, Canada, and 
http://www.wolseley.com/index.asp?pageid=69&newsid=14 (last visited Jan. 15, 2015). 
176. Id. 
177. Press Release, Wolseley PLC, Results of Court and Scheme General Meeting 2 November 
2010 (Nov. 2, 2010). 
178. WOLSELEY PLC, ANNUAL REPORT 54 (2010) [hereinafter WOLSELEY 2010 ANNUAL 
REPORT). 
179. For Wolseley’s employee figures, see id. at 89. 
180. For Wolseley’s geographical segment information, see WOLSELEY PLC, ANNUAL REPORT 
95–98 (2011) [hereinafter WOLSELEY 2011 ANNUAL REPORT]. 
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Central Europe (which includes Switzerland), with thirteen, six, and five 
percent, respectively, of the group’s total long-lived assets. In terms of 
revenues, the U.S., the UK, and the Nordic region accounted for thirty-
nine percent, nineteen percent, and fifteen percent of the group’s gross 
revenues, respectively. France, Canada, and Central Europe accounted 
for fifteen percent, six percent, and six percent. Within the small Central 
European segment, Switzerland was Wolseley’s most profitable area.181 
However, in comparison to global operations, Switzerland seems 
marginal. 
As in the case of Shire, it seems that agglomeration benefits played 
little role in the inversion plan. In explaining the inversion, Wolseley 
reasoned that the inversion is “expected to enable the Group to achieve a 
competitive effective corporate tax rate”182 of “up to 28 per cent in the 
first full financial year”183 following the inversion. A post-inversion 
twenty-eight percent effective tax rate seems rather significant. 
However, it represented an improvement compared to Old Wolseley’s 
effective tax rate, which was thirty-four percent for 2010.184 The main 
difference from Shire’s inversion—which makes the inquiry into 
Wolseley’s inversion worthwhile—is that significant tax reforms took 
place in the UK by the time of Wolseley’s inversion. 
In July of 2009 (before the inversion plan had been announced), the 
UK effectuated a reform of its tax system, exempting most foreign 
source income from UK taxation.185 By doing so, the UK functionally 
adopted a territorial system of taxation. This is of major significance, as 
territoriality is frequently advocated as a remedy to the problem of 
corporate inversions, with many commentators pointing to the UK as an 
example.186 The UK reform itself has been pitched as a necessary 
181. WOLSELEY 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 178, at 24. 
182. Press Release, Wolseley PLC, Wolseley to Introduce a New UK Listed Holding Company 
(Sept. 27, 2010). 
183. PROSPECTUS, WOLSELEY PLC, INTRODUCTION OF UP TO 284,415,344 NEW WOLSELEY 
SHARES OF 10 PENCE EACH TO THE OFFICIAL LIST 6 (2010) [hereinafter WOLSELEY’S 
PROSPECTUS]. 
184. WOLSELEY 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 178, at 27. 
185. See MICHAEL P. DEVEREUX & SIMON LORETZ, CORPORATION TAX IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 11 (2011), available at http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Business_Taxation/ 
Docs/Publications/Reports/corporation-tax-in-the-uk-feb-2011.pdf. 
186. See, e.g., Amanda Athanasiou & David D. Stewart, News Analysis: Cheers and Jeers for 
U.K. Corporate Tax Climate Post-Pfizer, TAX NOTES TODAY (June 10, 2014); Michelle Hanlon, 
The Lose-Lose Tax Policy Driving Away U.S. Business, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2014, at A15 (“The 
U.K. may be a good example: In 2010, after realizing that too many companies were leaving for the 
greener tax pastures of Ireland, the government’s economic and finance ministry wrote in a report 
that it wanted to ‘send out the signal loud and clear, Britain is open for business.’ The country made 
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response to the problem of inversions by UK corporations.187 
Apparently, however, a territorial system was not enough of an incentive 
to keep Wolseley from inverting. A few other UK corporations 
completed inversions from the UK after the UK adopted a territorial 
system. Some examples include INEOS Group LTD. (moved from the 
UK to Switzerland in 2010)188 and Brit Insurance N.V. (moved from the 
UK to the Netherlands in late 2009).189 At the same time, other 
companies that had previously inverted out of the UK returned. Such 
companies include The Henderson Global Investors and United Business 
Media PLC, who have returned to the UK from Ireland during 2012–
2013 after making the opposite move from the UK to Ireland a few years 
earlier.190 
At least theoretically, inverting out of a territorial system might be 
particularly suggestive that the inversion will result in a true dislocation 
of economic attributes. In a territorial jurisdiction a corporation pays 
taxes only on income sourced from within that jurisdiction.191 Moving 
out of the jurisdiction would only result in a tax reduction to the extent 
the inversion results in less income reported in that jurisdiction.192 This 
suggests, in theory, that less income-producing activities would take 
place in the jurisdiction following the inversion. Reality, however, is 
more complicated. As noted by other commentators, a complex system 
of tax rules may allow foreign-owned MNCs more tax-planning 
opportunities to strip income from a particular jurisdiction than 
domestic-owned MNCs.193 Inversion in such context is a “self-help” 
strategy of domestic-owned MNCs to disguise themselves as foreign-
substantive tax-policy changes such as reducing the corporate tax rate and implementing a territorial 
tax system.”). 
187. How Other Countries Have Used Tax Reform to Help Their Companies Compete in the 
Global Market and Create Jobs: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Ways and Means, 112th Cong. 
24 (2011) (statement of Stephen Edge, Partner, Slaughter & May) (describing the UK reform to 
territoriality as a response to the threat of inversions). 
188. Press Release, INEOS Group LTD., INEOS Move from UK to Switzerland (Apr. 13, 2010), 
available at http://www.ineos.com/news/ineos-group/ineos-move-from-uk-to-switzerland/? 
business=INEOS+Group. 
189. Brit Insurance Holdings to Reorganise Its Corporate Structure and Moves to the 
Netherlands, NEWS INSURANCES (Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.newsinsurances.co.uk/brit-insurance-
holdings-to-reorganise-its-corporate-structure-and-moves-to-the-netherlands/01698589.  
190. Athanasiou & Stewart, supra note 186. 
191. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying discussion. 
192. This assumes, of course, that the expatriation is associated with real movement of economic 
attributes. When expatriation is formal, it is possible that anti-abuse rules will safeguard the tax base 
in that jurisdiction.  
193. See supra note 46 and accompanying discussion. 
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owned. This allows such domestic-owned MNCs to decrease taxes on 
income earned from within their original home jurisdiction. 
Indeed, in its inversion plan, Wolseley explicitly stated that “New 
Wolseley will have the same business and operations after the 
[inversion] as Old Wolseley has before the [inversion],”194 and that the 
inversion will cause no change “in the day-to-day operations of the 
business of the Wolseley Group or its strategy.”195 Wolseley also noted 
that following the inversion, it would continue to report its financial 
results in British pounds.196 
While Wolseley suggested its intention to establish and maintain 
permanent staff in Switzerland,197 such permanent staff apparently 
included “as few as four people in Switzerland managing . . . treasury 
operations.”198 Wolseley also expected the move to make little 
difference in the composition of its board of directors,199 and to have the 
senior executives of Old Wolseley become the senior executives of New 
Wolseley.200 While some changes to the board composition did take 
place, they did not alter the board composition in a way that implies a 
move of board members to Switzerland. In fact, the only change 
announced prior to the inversion was that one French non-executive 
director of Old Wolseley would not be appointed to New Wolseley.201 
This non-executive director was scheduled to retire regardless of the 
inversion.202 In addition, in the year in which the inversion was 
completed (fiscal year 2011) three British board members had stepped 
down. They were replaced by one British national and one Irish/South 
African national. No Swiss nationals were appointed to Wolseley’s 
board. At the end of 2012 the board comprised seven British nationals, 
194. WOLSELEY’S PROSPECTUS, supra note 183, at 6. 
195. Id. 
196. Anita Likos & Steve, McGratch, U.K.’s Wolseley Moves Tax Residence to Switzerland, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 27, 2010, 3:32 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424052748704654004575517950321881956. 
197. WOLSELEY’S PROSPECTUS, supra note 183, at 6. 
198. Phillip Inman, Wolseley’s Move to Swiss Tax Haven Raises Fears of Second UK Exodus, 
THE GUARDIAN, Sep. 27, 2010, at 29. 
199. WOLSELEY’S PROSPECTUS, supra note 183, at 6 (“New Wolseley will have the same Board 
of Directors and management as Old Wolseley on the Scheme Effective Date, save that Alain Le 
Goff will not be a Director of New Wolseley.”). 
200. Id. at 10. 
201. Id. at 46. 
202. Press Release, Reckitt Benckiser Group PLC, Alain Le Goff, EVP Supply Chain, to Retire: 
Successor Announced (Feb. 17, 2009), available at https://www.rb.com/site/rkbr/templates/ 
mediainvestorsgeneral2.aspx?pageid=288&cc=gb. 
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one American, and one board member with dual Irish/South African 
nationality. 
To summarize, it is clear that at the corporate level, Wolseley’s 
inversion was completely virtual. 
At the operational level, Wolseley’s segment reporting tells a more 
complex story. In the years following the inversion, the U.S. remained 
Wolseley’s largest market by far, with forty-one and forty-six percent of 
revenue in 2011 and 2012 respectively, and thirty-two and forty-two 
percent of assets.203 This represents a marked increase compared to U.S. 
operations prior to the inversion. U.S. workforce also increased from 
17,108 employees (thirty-five percent of the global workforce) to 17,822 
(forty-one percent of the global workforce) by the end of 2012.204 
The UK operations, however, showed a marked decrease. In 2011, 
the UK accounted for about fifteen percent of the group’s assets (a 
decrease of about two percent), eighteen percent of gross revenues (a 
one percent decrease), and twenty percent of the global workforce (about 
a two percent decrease, or a loss of 1129 employees). These decreases 
were apparently attributed to the divestment of two UK divisions, 
explained in the 2011 annual report as a part of a “strategy of focusing 
on businesses with significant scale and leading market positions.”205 It 
is thus not clear whether such marked losses of UK operations had 
anything to do with the tax move. Such divestments continued in 2012, 
causing further decrease in UK operations. By the end of fiscal year 
2012, 2334 additional jobs were lost in the UK, bringing the UK 
proportion of the global work force to sixteen percent (down from 
twenty-two percent prior to the inversion). Also at the end of 2012, UK 
only accounted for fourteen percent of global sales (compared to 
nineteen percent prior to the inversion) and twelve percent of global 
assets (compared to seventeen percent prior to the inversion).206 
While UK operations markedly decreased, and U.S. operations 
increased, no noteworthy changes occurred in other geographical 
segments. Interestingly, the central European segment (where 
Switzerland is located) did not show a gain in jobs (but rather a slight 
decrease) or a marked change in assets and sales. Today, three years 
after the inversion, Wolseley has 744 employees in Switzerland (out of 
39,286 worldwide) in 46 branches (out of 2917 worldwide).207 This is 
203. Segment information can be found at WOLSELEY PLC, ANNUAL REPORT 105–08 (2012). 
204. Employee figures can be found at id. at 113. 
205. WOLSELEY 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 180, at 26. 
206. These figures are based on WOLSELEY PLC, ANNUAL REPORT 114 (2012). 
207. WOLSELEY PLC, ANNUAL REPORT (2013). 
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negligible in comparison to Wolseley’s global operations. 
To summarize, Wolseley, like Shire, changed little in its UK 
management activities as a result of the inversion, notwithstanding that 
Wolseley moved out of a territorial system and that Shire moved out of a 
worldwide system of taxation.208 The virtual-management relocation 
pattern demonstrated by Shire and Wolseley has been followed closely 
by multiple other UK-based MNCs who have moved from the UK. In 
many such cases, UK MNCs have maintained the bulk of their 
management functions in the UK and have added minimal presence (if at 
all) in the jurisdictions to which they moved.209 
Wolseley did show a loss of operational attributes in the UK 
following the inversion. It is impossible to tell with confidence whether 
the inversion had anything to do with it, though it seems unlikely. 
Wolseley inverted to Switzerland, but the loss of UK activities was not 
matched by an increase in Swiss activities. The only segment showing 
marked increase in the period after the inversion was the U.S. 
Attributing the UK operational losses to the inversion would also 
contradict Wolseley’s own assertion that no changes were expected “in 
the day-to-day operations of the business of the Wolseley Group or its 
strategy.”210 It thus seems that Wolseley’s divestment of UK operations 
was part of its business strategy (as the divestments were explained in its 
annual reports for 2011 and 2012), and unrelated to tax considerations. 
Some of the geographical data of Wolseley’s activities before and 
after the inversion are summarized in Table 3. 
  
208. One commentator summarized what Wolseley UK employees need (or need not) worry 
about: “building supply depots are inherently local. Tax residence is irrelevant to their future.” See 
Andrew Hill, Wolseley’s Tax Move Poses Little Threat, FIN. TIMES (Sep. 27, 2010, 8:01 PM), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ed074288-ca67-11df-a860-00144feab49a.html. 
209. Tax Gap Reporting Team, supra note 157. 
210. WOLSELEY’S PROSPECTUS, supra note 183, at 6. 
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Table 3 – Summary of Wolseley’s activity by geographical segment before and after the 
inversion  
 2010 2011 (Inversion 
announced and 
completed) 
2012 
Board Members’ 
Nationality  
   
British 9 7 7 
French 1 0 0 
American 1 1 1 
Irish/South 
African 
0 1 1 
Total 11 9 9 
Employees211    
USA 17,108 (35%) 17,175 (37%) 17,822 (41%) 
Canada 2,503 (5%) 2,645 (6%) 2,599 (6%) 
UK 10,544 (22%) 9,352 (20%) 7,018 (16%) 
Nordic Region 6,468 (13%) 6,535 (14%) 6,565 (15%) 
France 8,831 (18%) 8,184 (18%) 7,020 (16%) 
Central Europe 2,591 (5%) 2,190 (5%) 2,016 (5%) 
Other 181 (<1%) 165 (<1%) 130 (<1%) 
Total 48,226 (100%) 46,246 (100%) 43,170 (100%) 
Local Branches    
USA 1,241 1,261 1,274 
Canada 220 221 220 
UK 1,486 1,059 919 
Nordic Region 285 288 264 
France 697 322 313 
Central Europe 189 144 142 
Total 4,118 3,295 3,132 
Gross Assets  
(£ million) 
   
USA 2,304 (33%) 2,288 (32%) 2,517 (42%) 
211. These numbers represent the annual average number of employees, which Wolseley 
provides as part of its annual segment reporting (as opposed to the number of ongoing employees at 
the end of the fiscal year, which Wolseley also reports). 
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Canada 357 (5%) 382 (5%) 384 (6%) 
UK 1166 (17%) 1,082 (15%) 735 (12%) 
Nordic Region 1,757 (25%) 1,878 (26%) 1,465 (24%) 
France 902 (13%) 1,095 (15%) 592 (10%) 
Central Europe 391 (6%) 345 (5%) 297 (5%) 
Other 181 (3%) 93 (1%) 42 (1%) 
Total 7,058 (100%) 7,163 (100%) 6,032 (100%) 
Gross Revenues 
(£ million) 
   
USA 5,174 (39%) 5,500 (41%) 6,168 (46%) 
Canada 765 (6%) 811 (6%) 850 (6%) 
UK 2,466 (19%) 2,404 (18%) 1,898 (14%) 
Nordic Region 2,012 (15%) 2,128 (16%) 2,125 (16%) 
France 1,937 (15%) 1,943 (14%) 1,666 (12%) 
Central Europe 849 (6%) 772 (6%) 714 (5%) 
Total 13,203 (100%) 13,558 (100%) 13,421 (100%) 
 
3. Nobel Biocare’s 2002 Move from Sweden to Switzerland 
Nobel Biocare (“Nobel”) was founded in 1981 as Nobelpharma in 
Gothenburg, Sweden. Nobel has been publicly traded since 1994 (first 
on the Stockholm Stock Exchange, and since 2002 on the Swiss 
exchange) and is currently the world’s largest manufacturer and 
distributor of restorative esthetic dental implants.212 
In April 2002, Nobel announced its plan of restructuring under which 
Nobel would move its tax-residence from Sweden to Switzerland.213 
Under the plan, a new Swiss subsidiary (“New Nobel”) was incorporated 
in Switzerland. New Nobel’s shares were then offered to the 
shareholders of Nobel in exchange for Nobel shares on a one-to-one 
basis.214 
At the time of the announcement, Sweden had a worldwide system of 
taxation in place and determined the residence of corporations based on 
the place of incorporation, much like the United States today.215 
212. History, NOBEL BIOCARE, http://corporate.nobelbiocare.com/en/our-company/history-and-
innovations/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 1, 2015).  
213. NOBEL BIOCARE, ANNUAL REPORT 28 (2002) [hereinafter NOBEL 2002 ANNUAL REPORT]. 
214. NOBEL BIOCARE, INTERIM REPORT 1, JANUARY–MARCH 2002, at 4 (Apr. 24, 2002). 
215. Sweden adopted a participation exemption system, a variant of a territorial system, in 2003. 
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Nobel outlined several reasons for the inversion. To begin with, 
Nobel suggested that “[a] Swiss holding structure will allow Nobel 
Biocare to optimise its corporate tax position to levels closer to 
standards with other multinational companies and thereby maximising 
the capital it can re-invest to grow the company and better exploit the 
market potential.”216 Nobel expected that the inversion would decrease 
Nobel’s effective tax rate to twenty-five percent in the year following 
the inversion,217 from an effective tax rate of about 37.5% prior to the 
inversion.218 
Nobel noted several other reasons for the move, in addition to the tax 
incentive. For example, Nobel explicitly noted the move would facilitate 
access to a larger “healthcare focused” investor base and better access to 
capital, as well as increase liquidity.219 
Indeed, prior to the move, Nobel had a large Swiss investor base. 
Nobel estimated that, as of the end of 2001 (the last complete fiscal year 
prior to the inversion), forty-seven percent of its total investor base was 
Swiss.220 Nobel’s largest shareholder was BB Medtech AG, a Swiss 
fund, which owned 12.7% of Nobel’s share capital.221 Another 
significant investor in Nobel was Metalor SA, a Swiss corporation, with 
a holding of 7.5%.222 
Nobel’s Swiss affiliation was also apparent in the composition of its 
board. Prior to the inversion, Nobel’s board comprised seven members, 
of whom four were Swedish nationals, and three were Swiss nationals 
(including the chairman and the deputy chairman). The CEO, appointed 
in late 2001, was also a Swiss national. Prior to her appointment she 
headed a Swiss corporation headquartered in Bülach, Switzerland.223 
See Foreign Income Portfolios: Country Portfolios, BLOOMBERG BNA, 
http://taxandaccounting.bna.com/btac/T4100/split_display.adp?fedfid=14574094&vname=tmippor
&fcn=2&wsn=535732000&fn=14574102&split=0# (last visited Jan. 16, 2015). 
216. Press Release, Nobel Biocare, Nobel Biocare Holding AG—New Holding Structure for 
Nobel Biocare AB 2 (May 27, 2002). 
217. Id. 
218. Nobel Biocare, Tender Offer/Rights Offering Notification Form (Form CB) 19–20 (May 28, 
2002) [hereinafter Nobel Biocare Form CB]. 
219. Id. at 19. 
220. NOBEL BIOCARE, ANNUAL REPORT 45 (2001) [hereinafter NOBEL 2001 ANNUAL REPORT]. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. 
223. See Marcus Balogh, Heliane Canepa Sinks Her Teeth into Business, CREDIT SUISSE (Jan. 19, 
2004), http://www.bank-credit-suisse-moscow.ru/ru/en/news-and-expertise/news/economy/sectors-
and-companies.article.html/article/pwp/news-and-expertise/2004/01/en/heliane-canepa-sinks-her-
teeth-into-business.html. 
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Nobel also had other business interests in Switzerland at the time of 
the inversion. According to Nobel’s 2001 annual report, Switzerland was 
the most penetrated market of dental implants (followed by Italy and 
Sweden).224 One of Nobel’s largest competitors, Straumann, was a Swiss 
company. 
It therefore seems that in addition to the tax incentive, Nobel had non-
tax reasons to move to Switzerland. The move would allow Nobel to be 
closer to its investor base, competitors, and customers in one of the most 
developed markets for its main line of business. Substantive move of 
management attributes under such circumstances would be consistent 
with literature in organization studies.225 Strong local affiliation of both 
investors and managers with the target jurisdiction would also 
ameliorate any frictions between managers and shareholders that may 
have different geographical preferences. 
Nonetheless, Nobel went to a great length to assure shareholders that 
it did not expect the inversion to negatively affect Nobel’s Swedish 
operations. In its description of the inversion plan, Nobel explicitly 
stated that the restructuring was not expected to affect Nobel employees, 
that all operational headquarters functions (including R&D) would 
remain in Sweden, and that production facilities would not be 
affected.226 Indeed, a comparison of the Nobel executive team in 2001 
thru 2003 shows that no Swiss executives were hired following the 
inversion, and that Swedish executives who left were replaced by other 
Swedish executives. 
Nobel also suggested that the board of directors of New Nobel would 
remain largely the same as the board of directors of Old Nobel.227 
However, changes occurred in Nobel’s board composition. In the year 
following the inversion the board comprised five members, of whom 
three were Swiss nationals (including the chairman) and two were 
Swedish nationals. This national composition of board members carried 
through 2003. In other words, after the inversion to Switzerland, the 
board shifted from a Swedish to a Swiss majority, a marked difference 
that possibly represents a significant move of management attributes. 
224. NOBEL 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 220, at 11. 
225. See supra notes 90–98 and accompanying text. 
226. NOBEL BIOCARE, INTERIM REPORT 1, JANUARY–MARCH 2002, at 4 (Apr. 24, 2002). 
227. Press Release, supra note 216, at 2–3. As a rule, however, a board of directors of a Swiss 
company had to consist of a majority of Swiss nationals resident in Switzerland. Nobel apparently 
asked for and received an exemption from this rule by the Swiss Federal Office of Justice, provided 
that at least one director authorized to represent the company would be a national and a resident in 
Switzerland. See Nobel Biocare Form CB, supra note 218, at 22. 
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This is rather surprising, since in Sweden, much like the United States, a 
corporation is resident for tax purposes if it is incorporated in Sweden.228 
It thus seems that all that Nobel had to do in order to invert was to 
reincorporate someplace outside Sweden and change little else. 
Nonetheless, a meaningful relocation of the board of directors did occur. 
Based on Nobel’s segment reporting it is hard to tell whether any 
other significant economic changes took place. Sweden was not reported 
as a separate segment in the relevant years, but rather was included in 
the “Nordic Countries” segment.229 Moreover, following the inversion, 
Nobel stopped reporting the Nordic Countries as a separate segment, and 
instead aggregated all European jurisdictions into a single segment,230 
further complicating the ability to learn of Nobel’s post-inversion 
Swedish operations. 
However, employment figures reported in 2001 through 2003 
suggested that no significant changes occurred in the Swedish 
workforce. Both before and after the inversion, for example, Nobel’s 
R&D team consisted of eighty employees based in Sweden and the 
U.S.,231 with the head of R&D based in Sweden. Prior to the inversion, 
Sweden-based employees accounted for twenty-nine percent of a 1328-
strong global workforce. In 2002, Sweden accounted for thirty-two 
percent of the global work force that remained unchanged in size.232 In 
2003, thirty-one percent of Nobel’s 1363 employees were located in 
Sweden.233 
It is also interesting to note that prior to the inversion Nobel had five 
major manufacturing facilities, located in Yorba Linda, California; Fair 
Lawn, New Jersey; Stockholm, Sweden; and Karlskoga, Sweden.234 
New Nobel maintained the same production facilities.235 
To summarize, Nobel’s move had some economic significance at the 
very top of the corporate management, with the board transitioning to a 
228. See Foreign Income Portfolios: Country Portfolios, BLOOMBERG BNA, 
http://taxandaccounting.bna.com/btac/T4100/split_display.adp?fedfid=14574093&vname=tmippor
&fcn=1&wsn=535730000&fn=14574093&split=0 (last visited Jan. 16, 2015). 
229. Nobel’s segment reporting for 2001–2002 (pre re-segmentation) can be found at NOBEL 
2002 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 213, at 31–32.  
230. Nobel’s segment reporting for 2002 (post re-segmentation) and 2003 can be found at NOBEL 
BIOCARE, ANNUAL REPORT 44 (2003) [hereinafter NOBEL 2003 ANNUAL REPORT].  
231. Compare NOBEL 2002 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 213, at 18 (2002), with NOBEL 2003 
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 230, at 18.  
232. NOBEL 2002 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 213, at 22. 
233. NOBEL 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 230, at 25. 
234. NOBEL 2002 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 213, at 21.  
235. NOBEL 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 230, at 22. 
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Swiss majority. At the board level, the move has been at least partial (if 
not full). However, the board had a strong Swiss flavor even prior to the 
move (in fact, only one new Swiss board member was appointed, while 
the appointment of two Swedish board members was not renewed). At 
the operational level, Nobel’s move seems to have made little (if any) 
economic difference in Sweden. 
Table 4 summarizes some of the data of Nobel’s global activities 
before and after the inversion. 
 
Table 4 – Summary of Nobel’s activity by geographical segment before and after the inversion  
 2001 2002a (Inversion 
announced and 
completed) 
2002b236 2003 
Board 
Members’ 
Nationality  
    
Swedish 4 2 2 
Swiss 3 3 3 
Total 7 5 5 
Senior 
Executives’ 
Nationality 
   
Swedish 8 10 10 
American 2 2 2 
Canadian 1 1 1 
Swiss 1 1 1 
Employees (% 
of workforce) 237 
   
Europe 27% 24% 25% 
236. Until 2002, Nobel Biocare comprised two primary business segments: Dental Implants and a 
product named Procera. Geographic information was provided for dental implants only. After the 
integration of Procera in 2002, a decision was made to change segment reporting from 2003 
onwards, to include all products in geographical segment reporting. Column 2002a should therefore 
be compared to column 2001, as both have figures that are exclusive of Procera. Column 2002b 
represents the restated results for 2002 after the change in segments, and includes Procera. Column 
2002b should therefore be compared with column 2003. See NOBEL 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, supra 
note 230, at 44. 
237. These numbers represent the annual average number of employees, which Nobel provides in 
its annual reports (as opposed to the number of ongoing employees at the end of the fiscal year, 
which Nobel regularly reports). 
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(excluding 
Sweden) 
North America 34% 34% 33% 
Asia/Pacific 5% 5% 6% 
Other 5% 5% 5% 
Sweden 29% 32% 31% 
Total (Global 
workforce) 
1,328 1,330 1,363 
Capital 
expenditures (€ 
thousand) 
    
Europe 6,321 (62%) 7,365 (60%) 8,435 (62%) 8,354 (60%) 
North America 2,615 (25%) 4,437 (36%) 4,653 (34%) 4,677 (34%) 
Asia/Pacific 191 (2%) 311 (3%) 311 (2%) 596 (4%) 
Other 1,128 (11%) 178 (1%) 178 (1%) 251 (2%) 
Total 10,255 (100%) 12,291 (100%) 13,577 (100%) 13,878 (100%) 
Gross Assets (€ 
thousand)  
    
Europe 109,724 (45%) 143, 572 (55%) 201,693 (62%) 256,498 (68%) 
North America 112,394 (46%) 95,482 (37%) 102,162 (32%) 97,650 (26%) 
Asia/Pacific 9,669 (4%) 9,248 (4%)  9,248 (3%) 13,927 (4%) 
Other 14,537 (6% 11,150 (4%) 11,150 (3%) 10,445 (3%) 
Total 246,324 (100%) 259,452 (100%) 324,253 (100%) 378,520 
(100%) 
Gross Revenues 
(€ thousand) 
    
Europe 105,578 (42%) 116,569 (43%) 136,529 (44%) 157,714 (47%) 
North America 95,655 (38%) 101,840 (38%) 126,580 (41%) 121,846 (36%) 
Asia/Pacific 27,182 (11%) 31,390 (12%) 33,341 (11%) 37,093 (11%) 
Other 23,658 (9%) 21,655 (8%) 14,740 (5%) 17,325 (5%) 
Total 252,073 (100%) 271,454 (100%) 311,190 (100%) 333,978 
(100%) 
 
4. The News Corporation Limited’s 2004 Move from Australia to the 
United States 
News Corporation (“News Corp.”) is a public multinational media 
conglomerate. It was founded in 1923 in Adelaide, Australia as a 
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publisher of a daily newspaper.238 Since then it became a media empire 
with interests in film, television, book publishing, and multiple other 
media-related businesses.239 
In April of 2004, News Corp. made public its intention to change its 
legal domicile and reincorporate as a Delaware company, with primary 
public listing of its securities to move from the Australian Stock 
Exchange to the New York Stock Exchange.240 While the precise 
scheme of the reorganization plan was somewhat complex,241 
shareholders generally exchanged their shares in the Australian News 
Corp. (“Old News Corp.”) for shares in a new Delaware-incorporated 
company (“New News Corp.”) on a one-to-two basis (one new share of 
New News Corp. for every two shares of Old News Corp.).242 The 
reincorporation was completed in November of 2004.243 News Corp.’s 
fiscal year ends on June 30. The inversion was therefore announced in 
the 2004 fiscal year, but was completed in the 2005 fiscal year. 
The change of incorporation from Australia to the U.S. resulted in a 
corresponding change of tax-residence from Australia to the U.S. 
Significantly, however, News Corp. explicitly stated that the change in 
tax-residence was not expected to have a significant effect on News 
Corp.’s effective tax rates in the foreseeable future.244 If anything, News 
Corp. had to reassure shareholders that the reincorporation would not 
result in an increase in effective tax rates. As a U.S. company, News 
Corp. would be subjected to taxation on its worldwide income at a 
thirty-five percent corporate tax rate.245 The expert opinion supporting 
the transaction stated that “[p]rima facie this is disadvantageous as, 
under the [pre-inversion] structure, News Corporation is subject to tax 
on its worldwide income at the Australian corporate tax rate of 30.”246 
It therefore seems that corporate-level tax-advantage was not a factor 
driving the reincorporation, notwithstanding that the transaction resulted 
in an inversion. The plan was driven by other factors. Rupert Murdoch, 
238. See RICHARD A. GERSHON, THE TRANSNATIONAL MEDIA CORPORATION: GLOBAL 
MESSAGES AND FREE MARKET COMPETITION 195 (1997). 
239. The News Corp. Ltd., Report of Foreign Private Issuer (Form 6-K) app. at E-35 (Sep. 15, 
2004) [hereinafter News Corp. Form 6-K]. 
240. Id. at 2. 
241. For a description of the transaction, see id. at 40–57. 
242. News Corp. Form 6-K, supra note 239, at app. E-1.  
243. The News Corp. Ltd., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 1 (Sept. 1, 2005). 
244. News Corp. Form 6-K, supra note 239, at 30. 
245. OECD Tax Database, supra note 107. 
246. News Corp. Form 6-K, supra note 239, at E-121. 
 
                                                     
04 - Marian_final.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/13/2015  11:46 AM 
2015] CORPORATE INVERSIONS CASE STUDIES 49 
the long-time Chairman, CEO, and largest shareholder of News Corp., 
stated at the time that “[w]e undertook this move for one reason: to 
create greater value for our shareholders.”247 The expected benefit for 
shareholders was to come from several factors such as: 
[e]nhanced US-based demand for the company’s shares, over 
time, resulting from an expanded active US shareholder base 
and the expected inclusion in major US indices; Potential 
narrowing of the trading discount of the non-voting shares 
relative to the voting shares, further enhancing the relative value 
of the non-voting shares; Improved access to a larger pool of 
capital available in the US, which should provide greater 
financial flexibility and improved pricing for capital raisings and 
acquisition purposes; Full consolidation and control of [a 
publishing business] . . . ; Reduced corporate complexity; and 
[e]xternal reporting in a manner consistent with News 
Corporation’s peer group in the US.248 
It thus seems that the move was financially-driven and not tax-
driven.249 Indeed, in the two decades preceding the inversion, News 
Corp. aggressively expanded its U.S. operations.250 For example, it 
acquired 20th Century Fox in 1985, Fox TV Network in 1987, launched 
the Fox News Channel in 1996, and completed the acquisition of 
DirecTV in 2003.251 Approximately seventy percent of the group’s 
revenues, eighty percent of the profits, and eighty percent the long-lived 
assets were located in the United States at the time of the inversion.252 
The corporate operational headquarters was in New York, where it had 
been located for twenty years by the time of the move.253 
The largest shareholder of News Corp. was the Murdoch family 
that—through various holding entities—controlled 29.86% of the voting 
power (this was expected to decrease to 29.47% after the completion of 
the transaction).254 Mr. Murdoch, although born in Australia, has lived in 
247. THE NEWS CORP. LTD., ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2004) [hereinafter NEWS CORP. ANNUAL 
REPORT]. 
248. News Corp. Form 6-K, supra note 239, at 2 (list formatting omitted). 
249. Id. at 1 (“Mr. Murdoch said the proposal was designed to make News Corporation a more 
attractive investment to shareholders and that he believes the proposal has potential benefits for 
shareholders.”). 
250. See id. at app. E-35. 
251. Id. 
252. Id. at E-3. 
253. Id. at E-5. 
254. Id. at 9.  
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the U.S. since 1974 and became a U.S. citizen in 1985.255 Moreover, 
U.S. investors controlled the largest share of publicly-traded stock with 
20.83% holding in the ordinary class of voting stock, and 34.28% of the 
non-voting preferred stock.256 News Corp.’s board was also U.S.-
dominated. According to the 2004 annual report, eleven board members 
were U.S. nationals, four were Australians, one was British, and one was 
Finnish. 
Given the dominant U.S. flavor of News Corp. operations and 
management at the time of the transaction, the expert opinion supporting 
the transaction concluded that News Corp. was “already a United States 
based company.”257 A change in legal domicile simply followed News 
Corp.’s business reality.258 
The transaction did not go without conflict. Australian investors—
who have held a significant stake in News Corp.—were concerned that 
corporate governance would be affected to their disadvantage given the 
difference between Australian and U.S. corporate and securities laws, as 
well as the physical dislocation of governance mechanisms (such as that 
the general meeting would no longer be held in Adelaide).259 This 
eventually resulted in legal battles and the offloading of shares by 
Australian institutional investors.260 Some have speculated that the move 
was indeed driven by controlling shareholders’ desire to take advantage 
of governance mechanisms available under U.S. law, but not under 
Australian law.261 
It is also interesting to note that from an investor-level-tax point of 
view, the inversion might have been detrimental to Australian 
shareholders, but beneficial to U.S. shareholders. Most jurisdictions in 
the world, U.S. and Australia included, impose withholding tax on 
dividend payments from domestic corporations to foreign 
255. Simon Coppock, Murdoch, Keith Rupert, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN MANAGEMENT 393, 393 (Morgen Witzel ed., 2005).  
256. News Corp. Form 6-K, supra note 239, at app. E-86. 
257. Id. at E-5. 
258. Id. at E-4 (“[A] change of domicile is probably inevitable at some point if the shareholder 
base becomes increasingly dominated by United States investors. Deferring this event will not make 
the index and transition issues go away.”).  
259. For a detailed discussion of shareholders’ disputes the ensued, see Jennifer G. Hill, 
Subverting Shareholder Rights: Lessons from News Corp.’s Migration to Delaware, 63 VAND. L. 
REV. 1 (2010). 
260. Richard Siklos, News Corp. Sued over Poison Pill Move, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2005, at C3.  
261. News Corp. Form 6-K, supra note 239, at 29–40 (discussing comparative differences in 
respect of the poison pill mechanism adopted by News Corp. following the inversion). 
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shareholders.262 This meant that prior to the inversion, U.S. shareholders 
(including the Murdoch family), but not Australian shareholders, were 
subject to dividend withholding tax in Australia on any dividend paid by 
Old News Corp. (under the U.S.-Australia tax treaty, the rate is five 
percent to shareholders who hold ten percent or more of the voting 
power, and fifteen percent to all others).263 After the inversion, U.S. 
shareholders (including the Murdoch family) were not subject to 
dividend withholding tax on any dividend paid by New News Corp., 
while Australian shareholders were. 
However, notwithstanding corporate governance and other agency 
issues, News Corp. went to a great length to explain that its Australian 
operations would not be affected by the move. New News Corp.’s 
registration statement (made in connection with New News Corp.’s 
stock offering) suggested that “the Directors of News Corporation do not 
intend to make (a) any material change to the continuation of the 
business of News Corporation; (b) any major changes to the business of 
News Corporation, including redeploying of fixed assets; or (c) any 
change to the future employment of the present employees of News 
Corporation.”264 Mr. Murdoch, in his annual letter to shareholders, 
added that notwithstanding the inversion plan, “[f]or more than 80 years, 
the Company has proudly called Australia its home. It is where the 
Company was founded, nurtured, and from where we get our 
entrepreneurial spirit. Australia is our spiritual home, and will always 
remain so.”265 He noted that “[t]he move will have no discernible impact 
on our operations, in Australia or elsewhere. We will remain a proud and 
vital part of the Australian media landscape with a listing on the 
262. AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 151, at 510 (“All of the systems under consideration here 
[including United States and Australia] impose gross based withholding tax on certain categories of 
income.”). For United States withholding, see id. at 510. For Australian withholding, see id. at 513. 
It should be noted however, that shareholders in worldwide systems would generally be entitled to 
receive credit for foreign tax paid. Difference in the national identity may still be relevant for the 
after-tax outcome of shareholders, however, if under national law the entitlement for foreign tax 
credits is unavailable (for example, as a result of tax exempt status). See, e.g., Omri Marian, 
Reconciling Tax Law and Securities Regulations, 48 MICH. J. L. REFORM 1, 22–28 (2014) 
(providing numerical examples showing how the interaction of tax-exempt status and foreign tax 
credits laws may result in different after-tax outcome to similarly situated investors). 
263. The Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of Australia for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal 
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Austl., art. 10, May 14, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 2274.  
264. News Corp. Form 6-K, supra note 239, at 94; see also id. at E-1 (“There will be no material 
change to the operations, management or strategy of News Corporation. The directors of News 
Corporation following the 2004 annual general meeting will all become directors of News Corp 
US.”). 
265. NEWS CORP. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 247, at 4. 
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Australian Stock Exchange—now and for generations to come.”266 
Indeed, based on public disclosures, it seems that News Corp. made 
good on its promise not to change its Australian operations. In the years 
following the inversion Australian revenues and assets slightly increased 
(consistent with expansion of the worldwide activity of News Corp.) and 
maintained (even slightly increased) their relative share in global 
operations. Australia accounted for eleven percent of the group’s long-
lived assets in both 2005 and 2006, and for fifteen percent of the 
revenues in both years (similar to pre-inversion figures).267 The national 
composition of the board also changed little. In both 2005 and 2006 the 
board comprised ten American members, three Australian (compared 
with four prior to the inversion), and one British. One Spaniard was 
appointed in 2006. 
To summarize, News Corp.’s inversion resulted in little change to 
Australian operations, both in terms of strategic management and in 
terms of local operations. Significant economic attributes had been built 
up in the U.S. over a period of two decades preceding the inversion. To 
the extent any meaningful dislocations took place in Australia, they had 
happened long before the inversion and were driven by non-tax 
considerations. Tax-residence seems to have followed management and 
business relocation in this case and not the other way around as 
empirical literature suggests.268 Moreover, tax-residence followed 
business considerations even though the change in tax-residence was not 
expected to generate any corporate-level tax benefit (and might have 
even been detrimental). 
Table 5 summarizes some of News Corp.’s geographical data before 
and after the inversion. 
  
266. Id. at 4–5. 
267. For segment information, see News Corp. Form 6-K, supra note 239, at E-40; The News 
Corp. Ltd., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 138 (Aug. 23, 2006). 
268. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
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Table 5 – Summary of News Corp.’s activity by geographical segment before and after the 
inversion  
 2003  2004 (Inversion 
announced) 
2005 (Inversion) 
completed) 
2006 
Board 
Members’ 
Nationality  
    
American 7 8 8 8 
Australian 3 4 3 3 
British/American 4 3 2 2 
British 1 1 1 1 
Finish 1 1 0 0 
Spanish 0 0 0 1 
Total 16 17 14 15 
Long-Lived 
Assets ($ 
million) 
    
United States and 
Canada 
Not reported 30,683 (82%) 33,764 (81%) 35,097 (81%) 
Europe Not reported 3,407 (9%) 3,381 (8%) 3,582 (8%) 
Australia and 
other 
Not reported 3,254 (9%) 4,768 (11%) 4,847 (11%) 
Total Not reported 37,344 (100%) 41,913 (100%) 43,526 
(100%) 
Gross Revenues 
($ million) 
    
United States and 
Canada 
11,150 (64%) 12,022 (58%) 12,884 (54%) 14,102 (56%) 
Europe 3,846 (22%) 6,015 (29%) 7,511 (31%) 7,552 (30%) 
Australia and 
other 
2,384 (14%) 2,765 (13%) 3,464 (15%) 3,673 (15%) 
Total 17,380 (100%) 20,802 (100%) 23,859 (100%) 25,327 
(100%) 
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5. Tim Hortons Inc. 2009 Move from the U.S. to Canada 
Tim Hortons is a fast-food chain known mostly for its coffee and 
doughnuts. It was founded in 1964 in Hamilton, Canada.269 It operated 
almost exclusively in Canada until 1995, when it was acquired by the 
U.S.-based Wendy’s corporation.270 In 2006, Tim Hortons went public 
as a dual listed company, listing its stock on both the NYSE and the 
Toronto Stock Exchange.271 At the time, Wendy’s sold 17.25% of the 
stock to the public.272 The remaining stock was distributed to 
shareholders later in 2006, and Tim Hortons has been a widely held 
company ever since.273 
The initial public offering (IPO) was structured as a spinoff of Tim 
Hortons out of Wendy’s. The spun-off public entity was a Delaware-
incorporated entity.274 Therefore, the publicly traded entity was a U.S. 
corporation for tax purposes. It remained so until the 2009 inversion 
discussed below. Notwithstanding its U.S.-based IPO structure, Tim 
Hortons’ management remained in Canada.275 After the IPO, Tim 
Hortons also continued to earn substantially all of its operating income 
from Canada.276 
On June 29, 2009, Tim Hortons (“Old THI”) announced a 
reorganization plan, under which the publicly traded entity would 
become a Canadian corporation for tax purposes.277 Under the plan, Old 
THI merged with a newly formed Canadian subsidiary (“New THI”), 
269. The Story of Tim Hortons, TIM HORTONS, http://www.timhortons.com/us/en/about/the-story-
of-tim-hortons.php (last visited Jan. 16, 2015). 
270. Id. 
271. Tim Hortons Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 99 (Feb. 26, 2009) [hereinafter Tim Hortons 
2008 10-K] (“On March 29, 2006, the Company completed its initial public offering (‘IPO’).”). 
272. Id. (“[O]f 33.35 million shares of common stock, representing 17.25% of the common stock 
outstanding. The remaining 82.75% continued to be held by Wendy’s. On September 29, 2006, 
Wendy’s disposed of its remaining 82.75% interest in the Company, by a special pro-rated dividend 
distribution of the Company’s stock to Wendy’s shareholders of record on September 15, 2006, and, 
as a result, since September 30, 2006, the Company’s shares have been widely held.”). 
273. Id. 
274. For a description of the IPO structure, see Tim Hortons Inc., Registration Statement (Form 
S-1) 45–46 (Mar. 21, 2006) [hereinafter Tim Hortons S-1]. 
275. According to the IPO registration statement, the principal executive offices remained in 
Oakville, Canada. See id. at 4. 
276. According to its 2007 annual report, 91.9% of the 2007 revenues were produced in Canada. 
Tim Hortons Inc., 2007 Annual Report (Form 10-K) 121 (Feb. 26. 2008). 
277. Press Release, Tim Hortons Inc., Registration Statement Filed for Proposed Reorganization 
of Tim Hortons as a Canadian Public Company (Jun. 29, 2009) [hereinafter Tim Hortons Press 
Release].  
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and the shares of Old THI were converted to shares of New THI.278 New 
THI maintained its dual listing in Canada and the United States. 
Tax savings was one of the stated reasons for the inversion.279 As a 
Canadian company, Tim Hortons expected to reduce its effective tax 
rates by four percent, six percent, and eight percent for years 2010, 2011, 
and 2012 respectively.280 The tax benefit was expected at least in part 
due to reduction in Canadian corporate tax rates.281 However, tax did not 
play an exclusive role in the consideration to invert. 
As noted above, following the 2006 IPO, the corporate management 
as well as most of the operational activity remained in Canada. The 
registration statement for the 2009 inversion offering recognized such 
reality, noting that “[c]urrently, our U.S. public company parent . . . is a 
holding company that conducts no business and has no material 
assets . . . We currently derive approximately 90% of our revenue from 
our Canadian operations.”282 
The board concluded that “[t]he existence of a non-operating parent 
holding company incorporated in a country where we conduct only a 
small portion of our business creates inefficient administrative 
complexities unrelated to our business operations.”283 Along the same 
lines, the company suggested that “organizing under a Canadian parent 
is expected to permit us to expand in Canada and internationally.”284 
Also, since Tim Hortons generated most of its cash flow from Canadian 
operations,285 it was expected that the post-inversion structure would 
“reduce exposure to volatility in reported earnings and other items by 
substantially lowering exposure to foreign exchange rate 
fluctuations.”286 The board even noted that the pre-inversion U.S. 
structure, coupled with the dominant Canadian flavor of Old THI, 
caused confusion among “lenders, suppliers, landlords and local 
governmental agencies.”287 Matching the legal domicile with the 
operational reality has therefore been pitched as an expected benefit of 
278. Id. 
279. Tim Hortons Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-4/A) 26 (Aug. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Tim 
Hortons S-4/A]. 
280. Id. at 19. 
281. Tim Hortons Press Release, supra note 277. 
282. Tim Hortons S-4/A, supra note 279, at 26 (emphasis added). 
283. Id. 
284. Id.  
285. Id. at 27. 
286. Id. 
287. Id. 
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the inversion. 
This story is well supported by Old THI’s corporate filings for 2008 
(the year preceding the inversion). At the time, the entire executive team 
of Old THI was composed of Canadian nationals. Similarly, the board of 
directors was overwhelmingly controlled by Canadians, with ten 
Canadian board members and only two Americans. Also at the end of 
2008, Old THI had 2917 restaurants in Canada, compared with 520 in 
the U.S.288 Old THI occupied 546,410 square feet of manufacturing and 
distribution facilities in Canada, compared with about 45,500 square feet 
in the United States.289 Canada accounted for sixty-six percent of Old 
THI’s long-lived assets and seventy-nine percent of the gross revenues, 
compared with twenty-seven percent and six percent in the U.S., 
respectively.290 
Under such circumstances, Old THI’s board was not concerned with 
any possible penalties imposed by the U.S. anti-inversion rule of Section 
7874. Old THI easily met the “substantial business activity” exception, 
as most of its activities were conducted in Canada, the jurisdiction to 
which it inverted.291 Section 7874 did not apply to the transaction.292 
A review of New THI annual reports in the years following the 
inversion indicates that no meaningful dislocations can be observed in 
the United States. For example, there has been little change in the 
composition of the executive team. In 2009, one Canadian executive left. 
One Canadian and one American were appointed. The executive team 
remained the same in 2010. The only change observed in the Board of 
Directors during the 2008–2010 period was the departure of one 
American board member. 
U.S. operations were also not negatively affected. In fact, New THI 
opened additional restaurants in the United States. The chain increased 
its U.S. presence from 520 restaurants before the inversion to 563 and 
602 restaurants in 2009 and 2010 respectively.293 New THI 
manufacturing and distribution facilities in the United States remained 
the same throughout the tested period.294 U.S. revenues remained largely 
unchanged, with a slight increase observed in 2009 (but a decrease to the 
288. TIM HORTONS, ANNUAL REPORT 37 (2008); id. at 36. 
289. Id. at 37 
290. TIM HORTONS, ANNUAL REPORT 37 (2009). The percentage figures take into account non-
reportable segments. 
291. Tim Hortons S-4/A, supra note 279, at 34. 
292. Id. at 34. 
293. Tim Hortons Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 62 (Feb. 22, 2011). 
294. Id. at 40. 
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pre-inversion level in 2010).295 While some decline can be observed in 
the value of the net U.S. long-lived assets (from $402,839,000 in 2008 to 
$324,600,000 in 2010), this decline has not been matched with a decline 
in revenues. A corresponding increase in assets can be observed in 
“corporate assets,” which refers to assets that support the corporation as 
a whole (i.e., assets the benefits of which cannot be associated with an 
identified geographical segment).296 
To summarize, Tim Hortons’ inversion was a virtual “naked” 
inversion. In fact, the very suggestion that Tim Hortons’ 2009 inversion 
is an “expatriation” of a corporation away from the United States is a 
misnomer.297 The transaction is much better described as repatriation to 
Canada. Tim Hortons was simply “returning to its origins.”298 Given that 
Tim Hortons has always retained its Canadian identity, one might 
wonder, why did it move to the U.S. in the first place (in 2006), and why 
did it wait until 2009 to return to its true home? 
The 2006 IPO was probably driven by the interests of THI’s U.S. 
owner, Wendy’s, which at the time held the entire capital stock of THI. 
This can explain the choice to go public as a U.S. entity. Under such 
circumstances, there was little reason to expect that the 2009 inversion 
would result in a loss of important economic attributes in the United 
States. Such attributes were always located in Canada, and were never 
the United States’ to lose. 
THI may have chosen 2009 as the year for repatriation for two 
reasons. First, as stated in the press release, Canada was in the process of 
gradually reducing its federal corporate income tax rates, from twenty-
two percent in 2007 to fifteen percent by 2012. In 2008, the rate was 
19.5% and was expected to be reduced to eighteen percent by 2010, the 
year in which New THI expected to start reaping the tax benefit.299 It 
seems odd, however, that a rate reduction of 1.5% made the difference in 
the decision to invert. Even before Canada’s gradual rate reduction, the 
maximum Canadian rate of twenty-two percent was substantially lower 
than the U.S. rate of thirty-five percent. 
295. Segment reporting information can be found at id. at 165–69. 
296. Id. at 100. 
297. See, e.g., Chris Edwards, Moving to Canada for Lower Taxes, CATO INST. BLOG (Jul. 6, 
2009, 11:52 AM), http://www.cato.org/blog/moving-canada-lower-taxes (suggesting that “Tim 
Hortons (essentially Canada’s Starbucks) is packing up its U.S. headquarters and moving to 
Ontario,” and that such move “might affect where higher-wage corporate headquarters jobs are 
located in the long run”). 
298. MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 14, at 7. 
299. Tim Hortons Press Release, supra note 277. 
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A second aspect for the decision to invert in 2009 is briefly noted in 
the registration statement. Old THI, the public company that spun off 
from Wendy’s, entered into certain tax sharing agreements with its 
parent as part of the IPO.300 Tax sharing agreements generally prevent a 
corporation from taking any actions that change the ownership structure 
within an affiliated group.301 Also, the U.S. tax code restricts certain 
dispositions in spun-off companies’ stock from taking place too close in 
time after the spinoff.302 These issues were explicitly noted in the 
registration statement as restrictions that prevented earlier changes to the 
corporate structure.303 One might wonder what would have happened if 
it were not for the contractual obligations and the time limits embedded 
in the U.S. Code. 
Table 6 summarizes some of Tim Hortons’ geographical data before 
and after the inversion. 
 
Table 6 – Summary of Tim Hortons activity by geographical segment before and after the 
inversion  
 2008 2009 (Inversion 
announced and 
completed) 
2010 
Executives’ 
Nationality  
   
Canadian304 9 9 9 
American 0 1 1 
Total 9 10 10 
Board Members’ 
Nationality305 
   
300. Tim Hortons S-1, supra note 274, at 117–18. 
301. Tim Hortons S-4/A, supra note 279, at 26 (“As a result of a tax sharing agreement that we 
entered into with Wendy’s at the time of our IPO, and of time constraints under U.S. tax rules 
relating to our spinoff from Wendy’s, our ability to engage in certain acquisitions, reorganizations 
and other transactions was limited for a period of time. These restrictions have now expired.”). For a 
discussion of reasons for such restrictions, see Stanley Barsky, Tips on Drafting Tax Sharing 
Agreements, 144 TAX NOTES 180 (2014). 
302. For a discussion of such restrictions, see Herbert N. Beller & Lori E. Harwell, After the 
Spin: Preserving Tax-Free Treatment Under Section 355, 92 TAX NOTES 1587 (2001). 
303. See Tim Hortons S-4/A, supra note 279, at 26. 
304. This includes one executive with a dual Canadian/British citizenship. 
305. The nationality of most of Tim Hortons’ executives is based on inferences such as the 
executives’ education and other managerial positions. Most are not included in biographical 
databases that provide citizenship data. 
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Canadian 10 10 10 
American 2 2 1 
Total 12 12 11 
Restaurants    
Canada 2,917 3,015 3,148 
U.S. 520 563 602 
Ireland 247 206 194 
UK 46 85 81 
Afghanistan  1 1 1 
Total 3,731 3,870 4,026 
Properties (Sq. 
Ft.) 
   
Canada  546,410 622,410 757,490 
U.S. ≈ 45,500306 ≈ 45,500 ≈ 45,500 
Gross Assets ($ 
thousands) 
   
Canada 1,290,219 (62%) 1,373,325 (66%) 1,686,209 (68%) 
U.S. 567,557 (27%) 478,395 (23%) 424,089 (17%) 
Variable 
Interests307 213,407 (10%) 226,470 (11%) 37,868 (2%) 
Corporate308 26,511 (1%) 16,101 (1%) 333,350 (13%) 
Total 2,097,694 (100%) 2,094,291 (100%) 2,481,516 (100%) 
Long Lived 
Assets  
(net, $ thousands) 
   
Canada 913,823 (61%) 967,879 (65%) 1,012,322 (74%) 
U.S. 402,839 (27%) 356,560 (24%) 324,600 (24%) 
Variable Interests 163,376 (11%) 156,712 (10%) 25,252 (2%) 
Corporate 13,647 (1%) 12,881 (1%) 11,496 (1%) 
Total 1,493,685 (100%) 1,494,032 (100%) 1,373,670 (100%) 
306. This includes three assets that are reported as having a size of greater than 2500 square feet. 
For purposes of the calculation, it is assumed that each asset has a size of 2500 square feet. 
307. Variable interests include consolidation of financial results in “variable interest entities” 
which include entities in which a holder holds controlling interest that is not based on majority of 
voting rights. 
308. Corporate assets include assets that benefit the groups as a whole, rather than an identified 
geographical segment. 
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Revenues  
($ thousands) 
   
Canada 1,750,399 (79%) 1,914,210 (78%) 2,114,419 (83%) 
U.S. 122,679 (6%) 140,491 (6%) 123,116 (5%) 
Variable Interests 356,095 (16%) 384,152 (16%) 298,960 (12%) 
Total 2,229,173 (100%) 2,438,853 (100%) 2,536,495 (100%) 
 
IV. DISCUSSION: PATTERNS OF INVERSIONS AND HOME 
COUNTRY DISLOCATIONS 
A. Summary of Findings 
Table 7 summarizes each of the case studies discussed. It outlines 
whether tax-saving was a factor driving the inversion, as well as the 
business affiliation of each inverting corporation to the target 
jurisdiction. The two right-most columns summarize what types of 
meaningful dislocations can be observed in the home jurisdiction 
following the inversion. 
 
Table 7 – Summary of observed dislocations in the home jurisdictions 
Inverting 
corporation 
Was entity-
level tax 
saving a 
driving 
factor? 
Pre-inversion interests in 
target jurisdiction 
Management 
relocation 
Can other home-
jurisdiction 
dislocations be 
observed? 
Shire 
Pharmaceuticals Yes Insignificant No; Virtual No 
Wolseley PLC Yes Insignificant No; Virtual 
Yes, operational, 
but not to target 
jurisdiction; 
Unclear if 
attributable to 
inversion 
Nobel Biocare Yes 
Significant: Board members, 
CEO nationality; Investor 
base; Major local market 
Yes; partial to 
full No 
News 
Corporation No 
Significant: Board members’ 
nationality; Functional HQ; 
Controlling shareholders 
nationality; Investor base; 
Largest market of operations 
Management 
already located 
in target 
jurisdiction 
Yes, corporate 
governance 
functions; direct 
result of the 
inversion 
Tim Hortons Yes 
Significant: Board members 
and executives nationality; 
Functional HQ; Largest 
market of operations 
Management 
already located 
in target 
jurisdiction 
No; Operational 
activities already 
located in target 
jurisdiction 
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The first obvious outcome from an analysis of the case studies is that 
the type and scope of meaningful dislocations varies tremendously. 
Whether an inversion is associated with the dislocation of meaningful 
functions in the home jurisdiction is a highly contextualized question. 
Therefore, a blanket policy statement according to which inversions 
result in the loss of positive attributes cannot stand. This further supports 
the need for an observation-based theory that may explain the 
relationship between inversions and meaningful dislocations. Such 
theory can suggest propositions for future empirical research, which in 
turn will provide useful guidance for tax-writers.309 
A second interesting observation is that in all cases in which 
meaningful headquarters dislocations occurred, the inverting corporation 
already had significant business affiliation with the target jurisdiction. It 
is thus plausible to theorize that meaningful dislocations of management 
attributes are to be expected where non-tax considerations, such as the 
draw of the target jurisdiction’s financial markets, investor base, or 
personal affiliation of management are present.310 
This conclusion does not stand to negate the inverse, that is, that no 
dislocations are expected where only tax considerations are present. 
However, it is plausible to argue that business attributes in the home 
jurisdiction can serve as friction factors that deter meaningful 
dislocations. If locational tax rules are attached to such factors, 
inversions that are motivated solely by tax reasons may be prevented. 
B. Grounded Constructs of Home Country Effects of Inversions 
Various patterns of management relocations can be identified in the 
case studies that warrant further research. Section 1 discusses the 
chronology of inversions and meaningful dislocations. As explained, it is 
not at all clear from the case studies that meaningful dislocations 
chronologically follow inversions. It is sometimes observed that 
meaningful dislocations precede inversions. This suggests the possibility 
that in some cases inversions may be driven by meaningful dislocation, 
and not the other way around, 
Section 2 discusses the spectrum of headquarters dislocations, and 
demonstrates that the degree of meaningful dislocations, as well as the 
types of dislocated corporate functions, is different in each case. It 
therefore seems that the types of meaningful dislocations are context-
309. For a discussion of propositions for future research, see discussion infra Part IV.B. 
310.  Such a conclusion is consistent with the findings of Birkinshaw et al., supra note 8. See also 
supra notes 90–98 and accompanying text. 
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dependent. 
Section 3 discusses dislocations against the background of the tax-
residence tests in the home jurisdiction. It shows that a formal tax-
residence test, such as POI, is not a panacea against meaningful 
dislocations, and that a Real Seat test does not necessarily explain 
meaningful reallocations. This is contrary to the suggested policy 
implications of empirical inversions literature. 
Section 4 demonstrates the importance of reputation as well as 
conflicts of interests in the context of inversions transactions. This 
section suggests the possibility that such factors may play a role in an 
inverted MNC’s decision on whether to dislocate significant attributes. 
The dislocations patterns are discussed below, and are summarized in 
Table 8. 
 
Table 8 – Summary of dislocation patterns in inversions 
Inverting 
corporation 
Chronology of 
dislocations 
Spectrum and type 
of dislocations 
Pattern of tax-
residence 
dislocation 
Stakeholders’ 
interests in respect 
of meaningful 
dislocations 
Shire 
Pharmaceuticals 
No dislocation 
observed 
Legal relocation; 
no financial 
relocation; virtual 
management 
relocation; no 
operational 
relocation 
Virtual CMC 
relocation 
Interests probably 
aligned for virtual 
relocation 
Wolseley PLC  
No management 
dislocation; 
concurrent 
operational 
dislocation, but not 
to target 
jurisdiction 
Legal relocation; 
no financial 
relocation; virtual 
management 
relocation; some 
operational 
relocation, but not 
to target 
jurisdiction 
Virtual CMC 
relocation 
Interests probably 
aligned for virtual 
relocation; 
Interests probably 
not aligned for 
operational 
relocation 
Nobel Biocare 
Concurrent 
management 
dislocation with 
inversion 
Legal, financial 
and management 
relocation; no 
operational 
relocation 
Substantive POI 
relocation 
Interests probably 
aligned for 
management 
relocation and for 
operational non-
relocation 
News Corporation All dislocations prior to inversion 
Legal, financial, 
management and 
operational 
relocation 
Substantive CMC 
relocation 
Conflicts of 
interest for legal 
relocation; interests 
probably aligned 
for non-relocation 
of operational 
activities  
Tim Hortons No dislocation observed Legal 
Virtual POI 
relocation 
Interests probably 
aligned for virtual 
relocation 
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1. Chronology of Inversions and Dislocations 
The case studies suggest that when an inversion is associated with 
meaningful management relocation, it is not necessarily the case that 
management relocation chronologically follows the inversion. Rather, 
management relocation can be observed in cases where tax relocation 
happens after significant connections of the management to the target 
jurisdiction had already been established. This suggests that locational 
tax rules that are attached to management attributes (such as determining 
residence based on CMC) would not prevent inversions where there are 
business justifications for the restructuring (nor should it). Two patterns 
can be observed: 
Inversion Follows Meaningful Management Relocation. Under such 
a pattern, inversion is the last step in a substantive move of management 
and business operations to another jurisdiction. Over a period of time, an 
MNC may develop a foreign market that completely outgrows the 
MNC’s historical home market. When the MNC is no longer 
substantively located in its historic jurisdiction, but rather in the new 
market, the inversion follows the business reality. For example, by the 
time News Corp. inverted from Australia to the U.S., it was already, in 
substance, an American corporation. 
Tim Hortons is another interesting example in this context, but one 
that is somewhat different than News Corp.’s. In that case the inversion 
followed management (which was located in Canada), but the 
management was never in the U.S. to begin with. In fact, Tim Hortons’ 
first move to the U.S. in 2006 is an example of an inversion that was not 
followed by management dislocation, while the 2009 repatriation is an 
example of a “return to origins” type inversion. 
Inversion Complements Meaningful Management Relocation. 
Under such a pattern, at the time of the inversion, management already 
has strong business or personal affiliation with the target jurisdiction. 
For example, Nobel’s management move to Switzerland followed the 
appointment of a Swiss CEO. Three other board members were also 
Swiss before the inversion. Switzerland was an important market for 
Nobel, so there were both personal and business reasons to transfer the 
headquarters from Sweden to Switzerland. Tax savings supported such a 
move, and may have been the “final straw” necessary to initiate the 
inversion.311 It is possible that a more competitive tax environment in 
Sweden would have prevented the move. However, it does not seem that 
311. See discussion supra Part III.B.3. 
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tax considerations alone would have facilitated an actual move of the 
management. 
Other case studies not discussed herein show similar patterns. For 
example, when ENSCO inverted from the U.S. to the UK in 2009, it 
announced that “most of [its] senior executive officers and other key 
decision makers will move to England.”312 However, at the time, 
ENSCO already had significant operations in the UK313 
Theoretically speaking, a third pattern could occur, as suggested by 
empirical literature on inversions: 
Inversion precedes meaningful management relocation. Under such 
a pattern management move would follow an inversion, even though the 
corporation had no previous affiliation with the target jurisdiction. This 
pattern has not been observed in the case studies explored, but it may 
still be possible. 
2. Spectrum and Types of Headquarters Dislocations 
The case studies lend support to the decentralized view of MNCs’ 
headquarters. The dislocation of meaningful attributes cannot be 
described as a binary variable. It is better placed on a spectrum, 
consistent with studies in organizational science. Different functions 
may dislocate, and each to a different degree. 
For such purposes, Desai’s division of MNCs’ headquarters to 
“legal,” “financial,” and “managerial” is helpful in describing observed 
patterns of functional dislocations.314 The crucial question for the 
purpose of this study is whether it can be observed that a relocation of a 
firm’s tax home (part of the “legal home”) is also associated with the 
relocation of the firm’s financial home and managerial talent. This may 
help to articulate the types of attributes that may be lost as a result of 
tax-relocation. The loss of different attributes may dictate different 
policy considerations. For example, whether corporate relocations are 
associated with the loss of management jobs, or R&D activities, the 
effect on the local economy might be different. Depending on the type of 
activities governments wish to encourage within their territories, they 
may adopt different policies that specifically target management jobs 
(for example, granting tax incentives to managers to relocate to the 
312. See ENSCO Int’l Inc., Proxy Statement (Form S-4) 3 (Nov. 20, 2009). 
313. According to ENSCO’s annual report for 2009, the UK was the largest single-jurisdiction 
segment in terms of revenues, and accounted for about ten percent for the long-lived assets of 
worldwide operations. See ENSCO INT’L INC., ANNUAL REPORT 101 (2009).  
314. See supra notes 81–87 and accompanying text.  
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jurisdiction) or R&D activity (for example, by granting subsidies to the 
performance of such activities within the jurisdiction). 
Management Relocations. Relocation of managerial talent results in 
the loss of meaningful attributes, but does not seem to be driven (at least 
not primarily) by tax relocation. The movement of management talent is 
a matter of degree. It can be complete, partial, or virtual.315 Inversions 
driven solely by tax considerations seem to be associated with virtual 
management relocations (Shire; Wolseley). Full or partial management 
relocations happen in the context of inversions that are supported, at 
least in part, by non-tax considerations (Nobel; News Corp.). 
Financial Relocations. Financial relocations may bring about a 
change to governance mechanisms, which can be viewed as a 
meaningful attribute, the loss of which is detrimental. Indeed, Australian 
stakeholders in News Corp. who viewed the inversion as detrimental to 
the company’s corporate governance mechanisms fought to prevent the 
inversion.316 Changes in governance seem to be associated with tax 
relocation in cases where non-tax considerations are also involved 
(Nobel; News Corp.). Where an inversion is driven solely by tax 
considerations, no changes in governance mechanisms can be observed 
(Wolseley; Shire). 
Tax/Legal Relocation. Tax relocation, in and of itself, results in the 
loss of the corporate tax base. The case studies suggest that tax 
relocation may be associated with financial and management relocations 
(Nobel; News Corp.), but does not necessarily explain financial and 
management relocations. Also, management home seems more likely to 
attract the legal home than the legal home is likely to attract 
management. For example, contractual and tax obligations forced Tim 
Hortons’ management to maintain the legal home separate from the 
management home. Once this obstruction had been removed, the legal 
home moved to the place of the managerial home (and not the other way 
around). 
3. Tax Residence and Meaningful Headquarters Dislocations 
One of the main arguments against the adoption of a Real Seat test for 
corporate tax-residence is that it will induce meaningful management 
relocations. It is therefore preferable to have a POI test in place, as it is 
not expected to distort locational decisions in an economically 
meaningful manner. The case studies lend little support to such 
315. See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text. 
316. See supra note 259 and accompanying text. 
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argument, and contradictory patterns can be observed. 
Meaningful Relocation from a POI Jurisdiction. The adoption of a 
POI test for corporate residence is not an assurance against the 
dislocation of meaningful management attributes. Business 
considerations seem to dictate meaningful moves, even if tax 
considerations suggest otherwise (meaning, when tax relocation can be 
achieved without a management move). Nobel is an example of such an 
inversion. In that case, meaningful dislocations can be observed even 
though the home jurisdiction applied a POI test (Sweden), and the target 
jurisdiction applied a Real Seat test (Switzerland).317 Theoretically, all 
that Nobel had to do in order to lose its tax-residence in Sweden was to 
incorporate elsewhere. Nonetheless, a meaningful management move 
took place. Similarly, Tim Hortons’ management had always remained 
in Canada, while the place of incorporation changed in 2006 to the 
United States, only to return back to Canada in 2009. 
Virtual Relocation from a POI Jurisdiction. When the home 
jurisdiction is a POI jurisdiction, all that an MNC has to do in order to 
“lose” its tax residence is to achieve foreign incorporation. If only tax 
considerations are involved, there is no reason to expect further 
dislocation of economic attributes. This has been the case during the first 
wave of corporate inversions in the U.S.318 
In the same vein, Tim Hortons’ case study is an interesting example 
of a corporation that had little presence in the U.S., and therefore little 
reason to stay in the U.S. Tim Hortons’ management was already located 
in Canada. It seems that the inversion would have happened even if the 
United States had adopted a Real Seat corporate-residence test. 
Virtual Relocation from a CMC Jurisdiction. The case studies also 
suggest that meaningful attributes must not necessarily be dislocated 
when an MNC inverts away from a CMC jurisdiction. In both the cases 
of Wolseley and Shire, management relocations were virtual, 
notwithstanding the fact that the UK decides the residence of 
corporations based on a CMC test. 
This can be explained, however, by suggesting that the CMC test 
applied in the UK is not truly a substantive test. The ability to relocate 
without dislocating real management attributes suggests that the CMC 
test used in the UK is nothing more than a formal residence test (similar 
317. For a similar discussion in the context of ENSCO, see supra notes 312–313 and 
accompanying text.  
318. MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 14, at 1 (“These corporate inversions apparently 
involved few, if any, shifts in actual economic activity from the United States abroad, at least in the 
near term.”). 
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to POI) in disguise. In turn, this implies that corporations virtually 
inverted from the UK simply because—in the absence of frictions—they 
could do so at minimal cost (by having board meetings conducted 
outside the UK). 
Meaningful Relocations from a CMC Jurisdiction. One case study 
suggests that meaningful relocations from a CMC jurisdiction may be 
associated with an inversion (News Corp.). However, in that case it is 
clear that the meaningful dislocations happened long before the 
inversion, and were not caused by the inversion. 
Interestingly, one recent study suggests that inversions from European 
CMC jurisdictions are made from the UK to a much greater extent than 
from other jurisdictions.319 No “wave” of cross-border inversions can be 
observed from CMC jurisdictions such as Germany, France, and other 
jurisdictions known for high corporate tax rates. France decides the 
place of corporate residence based on the corporate “effective seat” 
which is defined as “the place where bodies of management, 
administration and control are located.”320 French courts have 
consistently refused to recognize the “foreign” tax status of firms that 
had no substantive attributes in the foreign jurisdiction, and all of the 
significant attributes located in France.321 Similarly, in Germany, the 
place of management refers to “the place of day-to-day business 
management of the company rather than to the site of its strategic 
direction.”322 To make such substantive determination, German courts 
consider, among others things, the identity of the executives involved, 
their performed management functions, and the availability (or lack 
thereof) of permanent management facilities.323 Simply conducting 
board meetings elsewhere would not suffice if an MNC sought to give 
up its German tax-status. 
It is therefore plausible that inversions out of the UK are common 
since UK MNCs can invert out of the UK with no need to incur 
319. See Laamanen, Simula & Torstila, supra note 3, at 197. Their descriptive statistics report 
that during the tested period, the net change in UK headquarter firms (i.e., MNCs inverting from the 
UK minus MNCs inverting to the UK) has been -14. For comparison, the second most negative 
change had been that of the Netherlands, with -3. Germany had a net loss of only -1, while France 
had a net gain of 2.  
320. Nicolas de Boynes, France, in RESIDENCE OF COMPANIES UNDER TAX TREATIES AND EC 
LAW 441, 450 (Guglielmo Maisto ed., 2009). 
321. Id. at 450–52. 
322. Joachim Englisch, Germany, in RESIDENCE OF COMPANIES UNDER TAX TREATIES AND EC 
LAW 461, 487–88 (Guglielmo Maisto ed., 2009). 
323. See id. at 489–95 (discussing German courts’ adjudication on the place of effective 
management). 
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significant costs by dislocating meaningful attributes. On the other hand, 
when tax-residence is truly determined based on substantive factors, it is 
plausible to hypothesize that the cost of the dislocations required to 
achieve a shift of tax residence operates as a deterrent for inversions. An 
interesting example in this context is Tim Hortons’ inversion, the timing 
of which had apparently been affected by contractual arrangements and 
time limits embedded in the U.S. tax code. These costs were apparently 
successful in deterring an earlier inversion. 
4. Conflicts of Interests, Reputation and Meaningful Dislocations 
Another pattern emerging from the case studies concerns the 
important role of conflicts of interests arising from an inversion, and 
corporate handling of such conflicts. Where potentially affected 
parties—such as managers, investors, customers and employees—face 
different inversion-related outcomes, agency issues may dictate 
particular results. 
Conflict of interest emerges as a relevant cost factor that may prevent 
meaningful dislocations. For example, if an inversion can be achieved 
without dislocations of management attributes, the interests of 
shareholders and managers are aligned, as both groups wish to see the 
effective rate of corporate tax decrease. If, however, managers have to 
actually move in order to achieve an inversion, their interests are no 
longer aligned with those of shareholders (assuming managers do not 
want to move). Managers who wish to maintain their place of residence 
may resist an inversion. 
Conversely, it may be the case that shareholders oppose the inversion. 
For example, if the restructuring itself is a taxable stock-for-stock 
exchange (meaning, a cashless yet taxable transaction), shareholders 
may be adversely affected. In such a case, shareholders may discount the 
value of future corporate-level tax savings in the face of current 
shareholder-level tax liability that is not accompanied by cash 
distribution to satisfy the tax liability.324 
In addition, in all cases explored, the inverting corporations addressed 
reputational issues that may arise from conflicts of interest, usually in 
the press release announcing the inversion.325 MNCs take great care to 
appease the minds of potentially affected parties. It therefore seems that 
inversion consequences that are viewed negatively by interested parties 
324. For a discussion of such considerations, see Jason Zweig, How to Owe Capital-Gains Taxes 
Without Even Trying, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2013, at B1. 
325. See supra notes 143–144; 177–179; 210–212; 238–240 and accompanying text.  
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may also serve as a deterrent for meaningful dislocations. This is 
consistent with literature suggesting that the structure of legal 
transactions has a branding effect and that negative branding may cause 
transactions to fail.326 In fact, recently, the U.S. retailer Walgreens 
scrapped a plan to invert to the UK. One of the reasons behind this 
decision was “the potential consumer backlash and political 
ramifications, including the risk of losing a book of business.”327 
Inversion with Alignment of Interests Regarding Dislocation. When 
the tax relocation is achieved with no conflicts of interests between 
stakeholders, meaningful dislocation will occur if all interested parties 
share a positive view of dislocation, and are less likely to occur if 
interested parties share a negative view of dislocation. Within an 
inverting corporation, different interests may align differently in respect 
to the relocation of different functions. 
For example, when Nobel moved to Switzerland, it seemed that the 
tax savings and the actual move of management were in the interest of 
both management members and the large Swiss investor base. Such 
alignment of interests may explain the meaningful move of the board to 
Switzerland. On the other hand, the interest of Swedish employees was, 
obviously, to maintain their jobs in Sweden. Some board members as 
well as the entire executive team were Swedish. At the same time, it did 
not seem that any interested party demanded the dislocation of Swedish 
operations. Such alignment of interests dictated that notwithstanding the 
tax move, Swedish operations remained untouched. 
When Shire and Wolseley inverted, both investors and managers were 
interested in tax savings. This could have been achieved with no need 
for the managers to move out of the UK and into the target jurisdictions. 
This may have contributed to the virtual relocations observed in those 
circumstances. 
Inversion with Conflict of Interest on Dislocation. When interested 
parties share different interests in the context of the inversion, conflicts 
may arise. For example, in the context of News Corp.’s relocation, 
Australian shareholders had different corporate-governance (and 
possibly tax) interests than those of American shareholders and 
326. See generally, Victor Fleischer, Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect of Corporate Deal 
Structures, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1581 (2006) (describing how reputational issues may dictate the 
presentation of transactions to investors, and how negative consumer reaction may contribute to the 
prevention of inversions).  
327. Maureen Farrell, Why Walgreen Chose Not to Invert, MONEYBEAT (Aug. 6, 2014, 1:48 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/08/06/why-walgreen-chose-not-to-invert/. 
 
                                                     
04 - Marian_final.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/13/2015  11:46 AM 
70 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1 
controlling shareholders.328 Such conflict presented an increased cost to 
the dislocation of meaningful attributes, resulting from shareholders 
litigation that ensued329 (though it did not prevent the inversion). 
C. Some Policy Implications 
The patterns of meaningful dislocations described herein are probably 
not exhaustive and definitely not exclusive of each other. The case 
studies should not be viewed as describing an empirical truth. This is an 
inherent limitation of case studies. They may point to possible existing 
constructs, but do not suggest that such constructs present the full 
spectrum of reality. However, the case studies clearly show that the 
relationship between tax-residence of corporations and the locations of 
corporate economic attributes is, at best, unclear. 
Each case study discussed combines different patterns, and different 
combinations of such patterns may be suggestive of various types and 
degrees of meaningful dislocations. It seems that some factors—such as 
personal affiliation of executives, business interests in foreign 
jurisdictions, and a large foreign investor base—may support meaningful 
dislocations. Other factors—such as conflicts of interests, substantive 
presence in the home jurisdiction, and reputational issues—may deter 
dislocations. These latter factors can possibly present policymakers with 
a non-tax toolbox for the prevention of negative effects of corporate 
inversions. 
One possible policy implication is, therefore, that frictions may play 
an important role in the design of corporate tax residence tests. Tests 
built on substantive attributes may prevent inversions and by doing so 
maintain both the corporate tax base and the economic attributes in the 
home jurisdiction. At the same time, substantive residence determination 
does not prevent inversions that are executed for sound business reasons 
(and hence accompanied by real dislocations), nor should it. However, 
more research is necessary in order to identify the types of frictions best 
suited for the design of tax-residence tests. The constructs identified 
herein suggest several paths for such future research. Future research 
may try to identify the variables that explain the timing of an inversion 
and the extent of meaningful dislocation that happens following 
inversions. In particular, it will be interesting to learn about the role of 
frictions such as tax-residence constructs and conflicts of interests in this 
328. See generally Hill, supra note 259, at 29–40 (explaining the difference in governance 
mechanism (specifically, board ability to adopt “poison pills”) between the U.S. and Australia). 
329. Siklos, supra note 260. 
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context. 
Another policy implication of the case studies, is that tax-residence of 
a corporation matters primarily for tax-base calculation, but matters less 
for anything else. The eclectic reality emerging from the case studies 
demonstrates the disconnection between a corporation’s tax residence 
and its substantive economic attributes. This reaffirms organizational 
literature on the decentralized nature of the modern MNC. Corporate 
tax-residence is not a good proxy for corporate attributes that 
policymakers may wish to have in their home jurisdictions. If that is the 
case, it is probably preferable to discount the importance of tax-
residence as a target of policy making to the extent such policy is 
intended to achieve non-tax goals. Instead, policymaking efforts should 
specifically be aimed at the desired attributes. For example, if 
policymakers believe R&D creates certain positive effects in the 
jurisdiction in which it is located, they should target R&D specifically, 
inducing MNCs to locate their R&D centers in the home jurisdiction330 
rather than targeting residence as a proxy for R&D. 
Finally, it should be noted that the case studies are not in conflict with 
the vast literature on the effects of tax on capital locational decisions. 
Tax possibly plays a role in driving meaningful dislocations of 
management attributes (for example, in the case of Nobel), but in cases 
where such dislocations are also supported by non-tax business 
rationales. In such cases, business considerations may outweigh the cost 
of frictions, and tax is a marginal investment consideration. In turn, this 
implies that developed jurisdictions should be able to determine 
corporate tax-residence based on substantive factors, without fear of 
competition from tax havens that cannot offer substantive locational 
benefits. Tax-residence competition may still be an issue to the extent 
that developed jurisdictions offer similar comparative benefits. This 
suggests that as long as corporate tax rates are set at rates similar to other 
developed jurisdictions, it is possible to determine tax-residence based 
on substantive factors without worrying about substantive dislocations 
from one developed jurisdiction to another. 
330. Inducing MNCs to have their R&D centers in a jurisdiction may be achieved using multiple 
tools such as an education system that produces a skilled labor force, building relevant 
infrastructure, or through tax incentives for R&D activity. This policy issue is beyond the scope of 
this Article. Most industrialized jurisdictions offer various incentives which directly target R&D. 
See Directorate for Science, Technology and Innovation, Measuring R&D Tax Incentives, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/rd-tax-stats.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2015).  
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CONCLUSION 
Taxes are an important consideration in the context of investment 
decisions. But they are many times secondary to real business 
considerations.331 Empirical literature that suggests that inversion 
transactions will cause dislocation of meaningful attributes ignores this 
simple truth. Due to the decentralized nature of MNCs, meaningful 
attributes may not leave a home jurisdiction following an inversion, 
simply because it is not necessarily the case such attributes were in the 
home jurisdiction to begin with. And if they were located in the home 
jurisdiction, there is no reason to assume such attributes will be 
dislocated in conjunction with a change in tax residence, if it makes no 
business sense to do so. 
Taking a case studies approach, the Article developed observation-
based constructs that describe the possible meaningful effects of 
corporate inversions in the home jurisdiction. Such constructs should not 
be viewed as empirical conclusions, but rather as providing an 
opportunity for more nuanced empirical research on corporate 
inversions. Future empirical study of corporate inversions should move 
beyond the binary variables of tax relocation and study the effects of 
inversions on multiple corporate functions as a matter of degree. 
Two conclusions, however, can be stated based on the observations 
made in this Article. First, an answer to the question whether inversions 
are associated with meaningful dislocation in the home jurisdiction is 
highly contextualized. It cannot be simply stated that an inversion results 
(or does not result) in meaningful dislocations. Various factors interact 
in different ways to bring about dislocations. While tax may indeed 
serve as an incentive to meaningfully dislocate, it seems to be a 
secondary consideration to other factors. 
Second, there seems to be an inherent tension between the desire to 
locate a headquarters where business opportunities can be exploited on 
the one hand, and tax savings on the other. It is clear that non-tax 
considerations play an important role in MNCs’ decisions whether to 
331. The Foundation of International Tax Reform: Worldwide, Territorial, and Something in 
Between: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 110th Cong. 32 (2008) (statement of Robert H. 
Dilworth, McDermott, Will & Emery) (“I have never actually met a businessman (or even a tax 
executive) who was actually involved in decision-making about the tax issues of where to locate a 
business (that actually employed people) who would agree that his MNC employer acted to invest 
somewhere because of an interest-free loan of residual U.S. corporate tax if the company invested in 
a foreign country rather than the United States. Businesses follow customers, efficient delivery of 
material and productive work forces to such an extent that tax incentives are often just an 
afterthought.”). 
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dislocate meaningful attributes, even where tax incentives to invert exist. 
This implies that it is easier for MNCs to engage in tax-induced 
inversions if they are able to shift their tax-residence without incurring 
the high cost of shifting real economic structures. Conversely, the need 
to change the location of meaningful economic attributes may operate as 
a deterrent to inversion, which in turn may support both the tax base and 
the economic factors in the home jurisdiction. 
 
